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A Plea for Rationality and Decency:
The Disparate Treatment of Legal Writing Faculties

as a Violation of Both Equal Protection and
Professional Ethics
Peter Brandon Bayer*

I. A
A.

PLEA FOR RATIONALITY AND DECENCY

The Derailing of a Career

I was about to enter my tenth year of teaching legal writing and
my fifth year as director of the writing program at St. Thomas
University School of Law. On my office wall were several diplomas:
a J.D. from New York University, a masters in Sociology from that
institution and an LL.M from Harvard. I have experience in legal
practice including four years as a civil rights attorney and three
years representing disabled individuals before the Social Security
Administration. I clerked for a United States district court judge,
and I have had published well-placed law review articles as well as
numerous newspaper "op-ed" pieces and a full article in the New
York Times Magazine.
I believe my record of teaching, writing and committee work,
both at St. Thomas and at other schools, evinces a high level of
proficiency coupled with complete dedication. While my work
certainly was not flawless, I thought I had earned a reputation as a
caring, effective professional in the classroom, a strong director of
my department and a dependable law school citizen. I was
understandably dumbfounded when, on April 7, 2000, the Dean (of
one year) summoned me and two other writing professors into his
office to announce bluntly that he had unilaterally decided to
overhaul the legal writing program and that our contracts would
not be renewed.
Formerly, the writing department consisted of myself and five
full-time writing professors. Henceforth, there would be 3 full-time
* Prof. Bayer has taught legal research, analysis and writing for over 10 years. He was
Director of the writing program at St. Thomas University School of Law from 1995-2000.
Prof. Bayer earned a J.D. and an M.A. (Sociology) from New York University (1978) and an
LLM. from Harvard University (1984).
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professors supervising twelve adjunct instructors. To the best of my
knowledge, the Dean had not consulted with any faculty members,
nor had he sought advice from the host of available outside legal
writing professionals. During the 1999-2000 academic year, I met
with the Dean and drafted two detailed memoranda both explaining
the pedagogy practiced by St. Thomas' writing professionals and
urging the hiring of one or two additional faculty members to lower
class sizes in light of the relatively weak analytical and
compositional skills of the majority of the first and second year
students. I did not recommend moving from full-time professional
teachers to adjuncts. The Dean's decision to completely rework the
style and substance of the writing program was apparently based
exclusively on his own counsel.
The Dean announced to the faculty that my dismissal was in no
fashion based on a lack of either capability or effectiveness.
Rather, in light of my plea for small classes, he decided to use
adjunct instructors instead of hiring additional professional writing
teachers. In that manner, without warning, without discussion with
other concerned persons, without consulting experts, without
regard for my years of service, without consideration of its
probable effect on my decade-long career, and with neither
expressions of gratitude nor a significant promise of support, I
suddenly found myself out of my profession. It was remarkably
disrespectful and cold-blooded, an extreme but not anomalous
example of the disregard with which a sizeable majority of
American law schools treat both legal writing programs and the
dedicated experts who teach that vital and difficult subject.'
The Dean's stunning reversal of my career underscores the
difficult reality faced by most legal writing faculty at American law
schools. As a general matter, few, if any, of us have job security,
faculty votes, or even offices on the main faculty wing. Despite my
productive work and extensive experience, my income as program
1. Indeed, the Dean did not tell me of his decision until the end of the first week in
April, well after the hiring season for law teachers had ended. Significantly, very shortly
before his announcement, the Association of American Law Schools ("AAIS") had conducted
a pivotal inspection expected to result in the recommendation that St. Thomas Law School
be admitted into that respected body. The Dean instructed the writing professors to
approach the AALS inspectors to discuss what the Dean then called our "very good" writing
program. Indeed, in the written report explaining the school's qualifications for AALS
membership, the Dean included a detailed description of the writing program that I had
drafted for St. Thomas's recent accreditation re-inspection by the American Bar Association
("ABA'). Quoting at length from my abstract, the ABA's re-inspection committee's written
report designated the writing program as "first rate."
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director was lower than the salary paid to the least experienced
tenure-track professor; and, the most senior writing faculty
member, after years of dedicated service, made barely half the
income of a tyro assistant professor.
The reasonable person may well ask why the academy has so
starkly and unkindly trivialized our work, marginalized our
existence in the law school community and, despite our important
contributions to legal education, made our professional lives a
matter of institutional inconsequence.
B. The Theory of Fairness - Standards of Law School Governance
Although I am not the first to write on the disparate treatment of
legal writing faculty,2 I wish to build on the work of my
predecessors by demonstrating that as a matter of academic
ethics, informed by cardinal legal standards of decency, the
disparate treatment and adverse terms and conditions imposed on
writing professors are not simply unfair but defy the ethical
aspirations of American law schools. Specifically, as the construct
for analysis, I will establish and utilize the proposition that the
discordant status of legal writing professors fails to satisfy minimal
professional ethics. As a model, I will show that it is not even
minimally rational under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution, our nation's bedrock protection against
arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable and unfair treatment.
The American Bar Association ("ABA"),
the institution
empowered to set the requisites for minimal excellence that law
schools must maintain to be accredited academies of legal
education, has promulgated "Standards" setting forth criteria
necessary for accreditation.3 Although no Standard directly
addresses ethical conduct among the faculty, schools are expected
to
educate
their students
regarding
attorneys'
"ethical
responsibilities." 4 Doubtless, a high standard of ethics likewise
2. See, e.g., Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in
Legal Writing Programs, 70 TEMPLE L REV. 117 (1997).
3. "Since 1952 the [ABA's] Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar has been approved by the U.S. Department of Education as the recognized national
agency for the accreditation of professional schools of law ....
The Standards describe the
requirements a law school must meet to obtain and retain ABA approval." ABA Standards,
Forward (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/foreword.html>.
4. ABA Standards, Preamble (1) (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
standards/preamble.html>. See also, e.g., ABA Standard 302(b) (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://
www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter3.html>.
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should guide the interrelations of law faculties. 5 Indeed, in a 1986
paper, the ABA's Commission on Professionalism unequivocally
stated that because, "the law school experience provides the
student's first exposure to the profession and . . . professors
inevitably serve as important role models for students, . . . the
highest standards of ethics and professionalism should be adhered
6
to within law schools."
Similarly, in its Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors
in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional
Responsibilities, the Association of American Law Schools
("AALS") 7 strongly admonishes that, "the highest standards of
ethics and professionalism should be adhered to within law schools
. . . both because of the intrinsic importance of those [ethical]
standards and because law professors serve as role models for law
students."8 Moreover, the AALS' Statement of Good Practices
advises that law schools should abide by the Statement of
Professional Ethics of the American Association of University
Professors ("AAUP"). 9 That document, in turn, provides this
stringent reproach: "As colleagues, professors have the obligations
that derive from common membership in the community of
scholars. Professors do not discriminate against or harass
colleagues ....
Professors acknowledge academic debt and strive
to be objective in the professional judgment of colleagues." 10 Thus,
the AALS and, to a correlative extent, the ABA prescribes that, "As
colleagues . . . professors do not discriminate against or harass
colleagues." By its plain language, this comprehensive prohibition is
not limited to such familiar bases as race, sex, religion and national
5. Cf. ABA Standards, Appendix 1 (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/standards/appendix.html (suggested standards for academic freedom).
6. The Association of American Law Schools ("AAIS") Handbook, Statement of Good
Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional
Responsibilities (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.aals.orgfethic.html> (citing AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE Spirit of PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT
FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 19 (1986) (emphasis added).
7. "The AALS is a non-profit association of 162 law schools. The purpose of the
association is 'the improvement of the legal profession through legal education.' It serves as
the learned society for law teachers and is legal education's principal representative to the
federal government and to other national higher education organizations and learned
societies." What Is The AALS? (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.aals.org/about.html>. Law
schools apply for membership based on a set of criteria and inspection procedures
established by the AALS. Id.
8. See AALS Handbook, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. American Association of University Professors, Statement on Professional Ethics
(visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.aaup.org/Rbethics.htm (emphasis added).
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origin. Rather, the ban is predicated on the overarching collegial
relationship among faculty, thereby forbidding any and all forms of
arbitrary or unreasonable professional "discrimination" and
"harassment."
Outside of more familiar contexts such as race and gender, the
accrediting organizations do not provide a detailed framework with
which to measure the appropriateness of discriminatory or
beleaguering treatment. Our legal training encourages us to utilize
general frameworks to help both order and explicate the meaning
of facts and theories rather than interpret situations purely in the
abstract. Therefore, I will employ a familiar, poignant, accessible
and law-related model as the paradigm to explain why the
particularized disparate treatment of legal writing faculty
undoubtedly violates the ABXs, AALS' and AAUP's mandated
ethical requisites. Specifically, I rely on the Equal Protection
Clause, the provision of the United States Constitution that
embodies the minimal standards of legal morality. Indeed, to show
how untoward the treatment of writing faculty is, I will not attempt
the politically ticklish task of analogizing it to racial, sexual,
religious or similar forms of discrimination. Instead, I will appeal to
the bulwark proposition and promise of equal protection:
governmental classifications are unconstitutional if they are
unjust.1 Official actions that are not so much as "rational,"
therefore, fail to meet the most basic standards of dignity and
12
personhood recognized by our Constitution.
Of course, the equal protection components only apply to
governmental actions, not to purely private conduct; 3 thus, any
equal protection argument regarding the treatment of writing
faculty would have legal force only against law schools owned or
operated by municipalities, states or other governmental entities.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to think of a more apt model to inform
the ethical standards incumbent upon law schools than the general
11. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996)
(citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)). As Professor Laurence Tribe has
noted regarding the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, "the notion that equal
justice under law may serve as an indirect guardian of virtually all constitutional values is
evidenced by more than a maxim carved in marble on the United States Supreme Court."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-21, at 1514 (2d ed. 1988). For a more
complete discussion of the moral imperatives of equal protection, see, infra, notes 16-59,
and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 16-104 and accompanying text.
13. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995).
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framework of minimal fairness under equal protection. The design
of equal protection, after all, confronts the heart of the ethical
concerns espoused in the applicable ABA, AALS and AAUP mores.
Equal protection encompasses the meaning of "common
membership" in a community and defines when treatment crosses
from legitimate to unacceptable discrimination or harassment. 14 It is
appropriate and fitting that law faculties - those entrusted to
educate students in the law - conform their behavior to the
strictures of equal protection because equal protection analysis is
one, although hardly the only, model of ethics and fairness that
elucidates the professional ethical paradigm. Thus, the equal
protection model as applied to the standing of legal writing should
arouse the sense of fairness that a general discussion of legal
writing's merits has not yet achieved.
Part II of this article provides a definition of "rationality" under
equal protection and links that definition to certain ethical precepts
of fairness such as the proposition that classifications cannot be
predicated on animus or inaccurate stereotypes. 5 Part III details
the modes of disparate treatment exacted upon legal writing faculty
solely because of their status as writing faculty. Part IV describes
and debunks the main "rational" bases upon which law schools
justify their disparate treatment. Having discredited the purported
rational justifications, Parts V and VI of this article explain why the
disparate treatment of writing professors is unfairly discriminatory
under minimal equal protection standards, and thus should be
considered not simply an unwise policy, but a patently unethical
practice that contravenes the standards set by the AALS, the ABA
and the AAUP.
II. THE
A.

DEFINITION OF RATIONALITY

The Constitutional Promise of Minimally Rational Behavior
from All Levels of Government

The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
14. See generally TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1514. Equal protection as a shield against
irrational discrimination is discussed, infra, in Part H.
15. This definition expands and explicates the earlier analysis I set forth in Peter
Brandon Bayer, Rationality and the IrrationalUnderinclusiveness of the Civil Rights Laws,
45 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1, 5-52 (1988).
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the equal protection of the laws."1 6 Logic and experience dictate
that the requirement that no State deny equal protection of the

laws

not

be

considered

a

barricade

absolutely

blocking

governmental bodies from classifying and differentiating among

individuals and

groups. 7 Such

a ridiculous

reading

of the

Amendment would deprive government of its most important
authority: the ability to set policy based on meaningful distinctions
among societal actors. Thus, " '[a]ll persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike,' [even though] '[t]he Constitution does not
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in
law as though they were the same.' "18 In harmony with the
foregoing, "[t]he Equal Protection Clause . . .keeps governmental
decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all
relevant respects alike." 19 This does not mean that legislative
classifications must be perfectly conceived; but, neither may they
be arbitrarily drawn. 0
To discern when governmental classifications cross the

admittedly

vague

boundary

from

acceptably

"rough"

to

constitutionally infirm - that is, to determine when legislation
wrongfully distinguishes among actors who are "in all relevant
aspects alike" the courts admonish that, at the very least,
legislation must be "rational;" or, stated inversely, governmental
bodies may not devise classifications subjecting individuals to
arbitrary or irrational treatment. 21 As a general matter, then, the
Constitution protects individuals' liberty from capricious intrusions
perpetrated through irrational official actions on the national, state
and local tiers.22 Granted, this limitation on government is
16. U.S CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (emphasis added).
17. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
18. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting ES. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) and Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)). Indeed, for 120 years
the Supreme Court has understood that "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to
secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same
remedies." Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879). See also, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 388 (1898).
19. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added) (citing ES.Royster Guano Co. 253
U.S. at 415). See also, e.g., Stefanoff v. Hays County, 154 F3d 523, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1998);
Mills v. Maine, 118 F3d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 1997).
20. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989). See
also, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Heuer v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321
(1993); Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10; Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70
(1913).
21. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-64 (1981); Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968); see generally TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1439-46.
22. The equal protection analysis applicable to states under the Fourteenth Amendment
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quintessentially nebulous, even by the standards of American
constitutional law. There is no clear definition of "rational" and
"irrational" and, very often, judicial determinations of unlawful
irrationality seem more ad hoc than premised on a well defined
paradigm.2 Nonetheless, the constitutional proscription against
irrational or arbitrary governmental conduct is, at the very least, a
pledge of fealty, albeit an indeterminate one, to the concept of
minimally fair treatment under the law. Regardless of class, status
or position in American society, every individual has the right to be
free from irrational treatment by any level of government - a right
that, in theory at least, is fully enforceable by the courts even if the
plaintiff is the only person against whom the irrational treatment is
directed. 24 The difficult question, of course, is determining when
governmental actions are irrational.
B. All Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Actually Are Variants of
Rationality Analysis
Before proceeding to a definition of rationality, brief mention is
appropriate of the various familiar "levels of scrutiny" against
which equal protection challenges to official conduct are analyzed.
In reality, all purported "levels of scrutiny" are judicial
5 Thus, understanding how the judiciary
renditions of "rationality.
,2
conceives "rationality" is integral to understanding the entire equal
protection realm.
The Supreme Court has set forth three general "levels of
scrutiny" under equal protection of which the two most exacting
are "strict scrutiny" and the slightly less f6rmidable "middle level"
scrutiny. Governmental acts reviewed under "strict scrutiny" are
presumptively unconstitutional and the government bears the
burden of proving that its conduct nonetheless is lawful because of
has been extended to restrict federal governmental actions as well under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); FCC v. Beach
Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 312 (1993); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 542 n.2 (1983).
23. See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L REV. 357, 357-58 (1999).
24. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000) (per curiam) (stating
that the equal protection clause recognizes claims brought by a "class of one"); Sioux City
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of
Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918).
25. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451-55 (1985) (Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J., concurring);
Bayer, supra note 15, at 8-16; Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100
HARV. L REV. 1146 (1987).
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a "compelling interest." 26 "[W]e have treated as presumptively
invidious [and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny] those
classifications that disadvantage a 'suspect class' or that impinge
upon the exercise of a 'fundamental right.' "27
In addition, the federal courts apply under certain situations
"middle" or "intermediate" scrutiny, a level of review that, like
"strict scrutiny," requires the government to prove the
constitutional validity of the challenged enactment. Unlike strict
scrutiny, however, the State's burden is somewhat less than a
required demonstration of "compelling interest." Rather, "[t]he
classification must be substantially related to an important
governmental objective." 28 "Middle level" scrutiny tests, inter alia,
the constitutionality of official sex-based distinctions 29 and
30
classifications predicated on illegitimacy of childbirth.
By contrast, "rational" basis analysis, often referred to somewhat
demeaningly as "mere rationality," is purported to be the least
rigorous standard by which to evaluate the constitutional validity of
governmental action. Unlike the "strict scrutiny" or "middle level"
standards, the government is not required to affirmatively justify
the particular classification under judicial evaluation. Indeed, any
governmental classification reviewed for "mere rationality" is
presumptively valid unless, "the one attacking the legislative
arrangement . . . negative[s] every conceivable basis which might
support it." 1
"[T]he three levels[, however,] mask the reality of equal
protection analysis, namely, that all equal protection challenges
require the courts to make one basic determination: whether the
challenged action is or is not rational."32 For instance, the Supreme
26. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
27. Id. at 216-17. Race and national origin are the classic examples of "suspect
classes." See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904
(1995). Examples of fundamental rights are the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) and Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), and the right to vote, Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
28. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). The Court recently summarized the
government's burden under intermediate scrutiny as requiring an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for the challenged classification. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996).
29. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530 (discrimination based on gender invokes a
"skeptical scrutiny" predicated on the historical persistence of unjust discrimination against
women); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex ret T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 & n.6 (1994); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-726 (1982).
30. See, e.g., Picket v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983).
31. Regan, 461 U.S. at 547-48 (citing Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1940)).
32. Bayer, supra note 15, at 11. Indeed, United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul
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Court explained why race and national origin are considered
"suspect" categories, "[s]ome classifications are more likely than
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative
rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective ....
Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any
proper legislative goal."3 Thus, the core infirmity of a "suspect
class" is that, almost invariably, it is an irrational criterion upon
which to predicate legislative classification. 34 Similarly, the Court
has clarified "middle level scrutiny" by explaining that it focuses
upon "the rationality of the legislative judgment with reference to
well-settled constitutional principles." 35 Therefore, as I observed in
Stevens, one of the most outspoken critics of the "levels of scrutiny" analysis, unequivocally
stated, "I have never been persuaded that these so called [levels of scrutiny] adequately
explain the decisional process ....
[Equal protection requires the inquiry] whether I could
find a 'rational basis' for the classification at issue." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451-52 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (footnotes omitted). Thus, according to Justice Stevens, every review under
equal protection analysis is, in fact, a judicial determination whether the challenged
governmental act is rational. See Note, supra note 25, at 1153-64.
Justice (then judge) Ginsberg has indicated that she agrees with Justice Stevens's
conclusion regarding the actuality of equal protection analysis. See FEC v. Int'l Funding Inst.,
Inc., 969 F2d 1110, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Ginsburg, J., concurring and citing
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Cleburne); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 246 (1995) (Stevens, J., with Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that "there is, after
all, only one Equal Protection Clause.")
33. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added); accord J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F2d
1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1983).
34. Consider, as well, Harperv. Virginia State Board of Electors that invalidated under
strict scrutiny Virginia's poll tax. The Court ruled that "a State violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or
payment of any fee an electoral standard." Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. The Court further noted
that a poll tax is irrelevant and serves no rational interest related to voting because "[vioter
qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax."
Id. Accenting that the ability to pay a tax is as irrelevant to qualifications for voting as are
race, creed and color, Harperconcluded that such factors "[are] not germane to one's ability
to participate intelligently in the electoral process ... to introduce wealth or payment of a
fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor."
Id. at 668. See also, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 n.10 (1992) (explaining that
Harper held that there was "no rational connection" between the poll tax and the asserted
legitimate interests concerning elections.)
The poll tax was constitutionally infirm not because the Court applied the condemning
"strict scrutiny" analysis but because the Court could identify no legitimate purpose for the
tax. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452-53 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The rational-basis test
. . . explains why a law that deprives a person of the right to vote because his skin has a
different pigmentation than that of other voters violates the Equal Protection Clause. It
would be utterly irrational to limit the franchise on the basis of... skin color.").
35. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16 (emphasis added) (stating that the denial of free
primary and secondary public education to the children of illegal aliens is a violation of
equal protection). Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 144 (1980), overturned
Missouri's workman's compensation provision permitting widows to collect benefits for the
death of a spouse while only allowing widowers to collect if they are mentally or physically
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an earlier work, "[tihe foregoing sampling shows that creation and
application of each level of scrutiny really revolves around courts'
determinations of what is and is not rational .... A practical and
meaningful understanding of the entirety of equal protection,
therefore, requires thorough analysis of the process whereby
36
official acts are deemed rational or irrational."
C. A Framework of Rationality Based on Dignity, Personhood
and Autonomy
Granted, a review of precedent reveals no crystalline, and regular
pattern resonating from decisions labeling certain governmental
conduct irrational and those upholding arguably similar official
policy as rational and lawful.3 7 Yet, we are not without some
general framework to aid in identifying, albeit imperfectly,
irrational state action. The cardinal concept of the Court's
framework for rationality analysis is the well known standard that
governmental action is rational if, "the classification rationally
furthers a legitimate state interest."38 Thus, governmental action is
constitutional if it is designed to promote a rational (legitimate)
40
goal39 and utilizes a rational (legitimate) means to attain that goal.
In a remarkable and nearly tautological explication, the Court has
opined that, "[i]n general, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied
so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the
classification." 41 Thus, the federal judiciary posits that the Equal
unable to earn their own wages or if they "prove actual dependence on . . . [their] wife's
earnings." Applying middle level scrutiny, the Court found that the classification bore no
relationship - that is, lacked rationality - to an important government objective. Id. at
150-51.
36. Bayer, supra note 15, at 16.
37. Scholars have been particularly frustrated with the seemingly haphazard manner
with which governmental action has been struck down as irrational. See, e.g, Farrell, supra
note 23, at 415.
38. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10; see also, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320; Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 439-41; New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
39. See, e.g., FS.Royster Guano Co., 253 U.S. at 415.
40. See, e.g., Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1971); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11; see also Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313;
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 (1990). Although there must be some rational basis
supporting the underlying official behavior, that basis need not have been expressed by the
official actor either when it devised or when it effectuated the challenged conduct. In fact, "a
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data" Beach Communications, Inc., 508
U.S. at 315; accord, Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 15 ("The legislative facts on which the
classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the
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Protection Clause is not violated so long as there is any
conceivable rational basis to support the governmental conduct
under review.42 The Supreme Court has distilled rationality analysis
through an often repeated mantra:
Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or
inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.4
Doubtless, the federal courts accord great deference to legislative
determinations challenged as irrational and, for sound policy
reasons, most such challenges fail. However, applying the Supreme
Court's purported framework of constitutional rationality is absurd.
The reason is apparent: no governmental act, no matter how
seemingly trivial, arbitrary or deleterious, is ever utterly lacking
some rational basis. There is always some conceivable rational goal
for any given governmental project, and even the most inane means
employed to attain the legitimate goal arguably may be justified as
acceptable. If official conduct falls within the ambit of equal
governmental decisonmaker."); Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 464; Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979); Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 E3d 307, 322 (6th Cir.
1998). A sufficient rational basis may be discovered by either the original governmental actor
or by the reviewing court long after the occurrence of the disputed state action regardless
whether that basis was or could have been considered by the official actors at the time the
state action was taken. Nordlinger,505 U.S. at 15; McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802, 809 (1969). Indeed, according a perhaps surprising degree of judicial deference, the
fact that the decision makers were empirically wrong does not necessarily render either their
past actions or even continued identical conduct irrational. See, e.g., Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. at 468 (stating that a legislative ban on the sale of milk in plastic containers in
favor of milk in paper nonreturnable cartons is not irrational even when based on the
misconception that the latter are more environmentally sound than the former when, in fact,
the opposite is true).
42. See, e.g., Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313; Heller 509 U.S. at 320;
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981) (explaining that governmental classifications
must "rationally advanc[e] a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective"); Allied
Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528-29 (1959).
43. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
Heller, 509 U.S. at 319; Sullivan, 496 U.S. at 485; Bowen v Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600-03
(1987); Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303; Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970); Madrid v.
Gomez, 105 F3d 1030, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998); Means v. Shyamcore, 44 F Supp. 2d 129, 133
(D.N.H. 1999); Schenck v. City of Hudson, 997 F Supp. 902, 906 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
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protection and if it promotes any rational end through conceivably
nonarbitrary means, as the Court's rational basis framework insists,
then every act of state is constitutionally immune from judicial
invalidation."
Judicial history, however, reveals that, albeit rare, official
conduct may be deemed illegitimate even though it is not subject
to strict or mid-level scrutiny. Contrary to the implications of
rational basis theory, judges (as their titles imply) can and must
judge the wisdom and propriety of legislative actions. Were it
otherwise, the Constitution's promise that no individual under its
jurisdiction will be subjected to irrational treatment by the
government would be meaningless and dishonest.
Given its overarching normative component, in no manner may
constitutional rationality be considered a "neutral" principle even if
neutral principles extend beyond certain schools of logic to realms
such as the distribution of scarce resources and the administration
of justice by the various branches of government.45 Rather,
rationality under the equal protection components of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments protects every individual against
"arbitrary" discrimination. 46 Legislation is "arbitrary" and, thus,
unlawfully irrational, if, according to the judgment of the reviewing
44. The Supreme Court's "technique of rational basis review can be so deferential as to
amount to no review at all. Any statute could survive a review that freely hypothesizes
purpose and does not insist that there be any connection in fact between a classification and
such a hypothesized purpose." Farrell, supra note 23, at 359.
45. Indeed, the Court initially adopted the limited standard that regulation is rational so
long as it "places under the same restrictions, and subjects to like penalties and burdens, all
who . . . are embraced by its prohibitions . . . ." Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687
(1888). But, not a decade later, the Court abandoned Powell's tautological definition of
"rationality" in favor of one applying an independent, extra-statutory measure of analysis. See
Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897); see also, e.g., TRIBE, supra
note 11, at 1439-40; see generally Ellen E. Halfon, Note, A Changing Equal Protection
Standard? The Supreme Court's Application of a Heightened Rational Basis Test in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 20 LOYoiA LA L REv. 921, 922-26 (1987). As Professor
Ely cogently explained, if no standard of rationality for any official classificatory scheme is
constitutionally required other than effectuating the classification itself, the classification of
necessity "will import its own goal, each goal will count as acceptable, and the requirement
of a 'rational' choice-goal relation will be satisfied by the very making of the [classificatory]
choice." John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE LJ. 1205, 1247 (1970).
46. See, e.g., Nordlinger,505 U.S. at 31-32 ("The purpose of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination . . . ."); Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1988); Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 461-64; Levy, 391
U.S. at 71; Sunday Lake Iron Co., 247 U.S. at 352-53; Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F3d 1196,
1205 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The rational relation test will not sustain conduct by state officials that
is malicious, irrational or plainly arbitrary.")
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court, the government has acted illegitimately.47 Government acts
illegitimately when the distinctions it draws are unfair and unjust.4
As early as 1886 the Supreme Court held that if a law "is applied
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as to practically make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material
to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution."49 While most often based on a
group distinction, the courts have clarified that the right to be free
from irrationally unfair government treatment is an individual
right. For instance, Judge Richard Posner has written that the
constitutional guarantee of rationality "provide[s] a kind of
last-ditch protection against governmental action wholly impossible
to relate to legitimate governmental objectives .... A class of one
is likely to be the most vulnerable of all, and we do not understand
therefore why it should be denied the protection of the equal
protection clause." 5°
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that governmental acts nullified
as irrational usually involve matters of civil rights, personal dignity,
selfhood in society, unfair denial of socioeconomic status in favor
of the aggrandizement of a powerful class, and similar affronts to
the autonomy of the individual. 51 In a much praised article in the
47. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (invalidating as irrational an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution prohibiting "all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of
state or local government designed to protect... homosexual persons .... ."); Cleburne, 473
U.S. at 432 (holding that a local government violated equal protection by legislating special
requirements for group homes for mentally retarded individuals based predominately on the
local community's distaste for having such group homes in the neighborhood).
48. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Model ForA Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L
REV. 1, 9 (1972) (explaining the judiciary's use of rationality analysis as an "interventionist
tool").
49. Nabozny, 92 E3d at 458 (quoting Yiwk Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74, the court found that a
student states a colorable equal protection claim against a public school district for
knowingly allowing systemic verbal and physical harassment because the student is gay.)
50. Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) (mayor's personal distaste for
plaintiff insufficient reason to deny plaintiff's business a liquor license); see also, e.g.,Village
of Willowbrook, 120 S. Ct. at 1074 (equal protection clause recognizes claims brought by a
"class of one"); Sioux City Bridge Co., 260 U.S. at 445; Sunday Lake Iron Co., 247 U.S. at
352.
51. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1438 (personhood), 1514-21 (anti-subjugation
theory). Borrowing from the philosophies of Kant and Rawls, Professor Edwin Baker offered
the following general exegesis of the normative basis for equal protection analysis in general,
and, thus, by implication, rationality analysis - "[all people (or, at least, all members of the
relevant community) rightfully can demand that the community treat them with full and
equal respect and concern as autonomous persons." Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality and
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1972 Harvard Law Review, Professor Gerald Gunther analyzed
decisions delivered during the Supreme Court's 1971 Term
overturning government action lacking rational bases. 52 Gunther
called such opinions rationality "with bite," observing that in
certain instances, although unwilling to evoke strict or middle level
scrutiny that would render the basis of classification presumptively
unlawful, the Court occasionally uses rationality analysis as an
"interventionist tool" to strike official conduct it deems unfair or
53
unjust.
A quarter of a century of subsequent precedent generally
confirms Professor Gunther's analysis. Although an infrequent
occurrence, the Court, applying rationality analysis as an
"interventionist tool," has overturned governmental action on the
basis of irrationality because any benefits resulting from the
challenged policy were overwhelmed by its ensuing harm. The
harm may have been intended by the State actors or may have
been wholly unforseen. Regardless, according to at least a majority
of Justices, a detriment may sufficiently outweigh a benefit so that,
in what we now know to be the heuristic parlance of constitutional
evaluation, the conduct under review "lacks a rational basis." In
this way, although scrupulously avoiding the labels of heightened
scrutiny, rationality analysis echoes the standards and concerns
found in cases on racial, ethnic and sexual discrimination; and,
indeed, citations to race and gender cases often inform why the
particular policy under review is irrationally unjust.
Within the overall framework that government conduct is
irrationally unjust if it offends precepts of personhood, dignity,
respect and autonomy, one may discern three sub-sets of
irrationality: government conduct lacks sufficient rationality (1) if
the decision to establish the classification is totally random or (2)
if the classification is designed primarily to inflict harm or
otherwise disadvantage a politically weak group or (3) if the
classification creates or threatens the creation of a caste system.53
These categories, coupled with ABA, AALS and AAUP precepts,
will demonstrate that the disparate treatment of legal writing
faculties fails to satisfy even the permissive tenets of "mere"
rationality and, thus, breaches the ethical norms legal education is
Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA_ L REv. 933, 938
(1983).
52. See Gunther, supra note 48.
53. Id. at 9.
54. See generally Bayer, supra note 15, at 32-52.
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obliged to uphold.
1. Rationality Cannot Be Derived from Flipping a Coin
The courts have held that government actions are irrational if
they are random, formless or inconsistent. The primary example is
Reed v. Reed which overturned as irrational an Idaho statute
mandating that among individuals equally entitled to administer
intestate estates, men would be chosen over women without
providing women the opportunity to establish superior
qualifications.5 Although the unambiguous standard for selecting
from among potential administrators likely promoted efficiency,
Idaho's law offended the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition
against according "[d]ifferent treatment... to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute."5 Because the goal of
efficiency could have been reached as easily by favoring women
instead of men, Idaho could not rationalize sufficiently why men
were preferred over women. 57 Thus, Idaho's accurate assertion that
its statute promoted efficiency did not justify imposing a burden on
women that might just as well have been imposed on men
instead.58
A decade later, the Court explicated Reed's theory of
constitutional fairness - "the State's articulated goal could have
been completely served by requiring a coin flip . . . . Such
legislative decisions are inimical to the norm of impartial
government." 59 Of course, at times government must draw lines
about which reasonable people might differ while not acting so
arbitrarily that, as a matter of aggregate detriments and benefits,
the resulting standard is unconstitutionally irrational. 60 However, as
in Reed, when a substantial unwarranted and unmerited detriment
55. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
56. Id. at 75-76.
57. See id. at 72-74.
58. Gender discrimination is now evaluated under the purported "middle level"
scrutiny. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
59. Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 n.24 (1983).
60. See Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315-16; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 117-18 (1970) (per Black, J.) (Act of Congress setting minimum voting age for state
elections at 18 is unconstitutional); id. at 294-95 (per Stewart, J.) (states may set
"reasonable" voting age, such as 21-years-old, for state elections); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (legislation is not irrational simply
because reasonable minds may differ over particular elements comprising legislative
classifications).
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is inflicted on an individual or group, a mere plea of61enhanced
efficiency is insufficient to justify the adverse treatment.
2. Classifications That Inflict Harm and Disadvantage a
Politically Unpopular Group
On several occasions, the courts have held as unconstitutionally
irrational government classifications that serve no better purpose
than to demean, humiliate or politically handicap unpopular
individuals or groups. In such cases, the courts discerned no
defensible motives underlying the challenged governmental practice
sufficient to justify the harm inflicted on the adversely affected
group. Rather, because they have done nothing to deserve the
adverse treatment, the challenged policy unfairly, often cruelly,
disadvantages the affected individuals for the pleasure of one or
more empowered groups As the Court forcefully admonished, "if
the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws'
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . .
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
62
legitimate governmental interest."
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno exemplifies the use of
rationality analysis to strike legislation that vindictively attacks a
disliked portion of society.6 Pursuant to the Food Stamp Act of
1964, food stamps - a federal program designed to help poor
people purchase food - were available to economically eligible
"households" regardless of whether a household's occupants were
members of the same family. Under amendments adopted in 1971,
61. In a similar fashion, the courts have struck classifications that, although neither
necessarily drawn nor maintained for vindictive purposes, lack any reasonable form, internal
consistency or merit, such that, in essence, they are too irrational to survive judicial scrutiny
In such instances, the impositions confound any legitimate design, the societal benefits are
meager, and the classifications upon which the impositions are based appear as arbitrary as
if derived from random acts such as flipping coins. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad.
Assoc., Inc., v. United States, 1999 WL 380810, at *10-13 (U.S. 1999) (under the First
Amendment, federal regulation of certain broadcast advertisements regarding lotteries and
casino gambling "is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government
cannot hope to exonerate it"); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995) (under
the First Amendment, federal regulation of labels of certain alcoholic beverages was so
inconsistent and ineffective in affecting alcohol consumption that the "overall" scheme was
irrational); Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 154 F3d 621 (6th Cir. 1998); Stefanoff v. Hays
County, 154 F3d 523 (5th Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Alabama Dep't of Pub. Safety, 831 F Supp. 824
(M.D. Ala. 1993).
62. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
63. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
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an eligible "household" could consist only of "related" individuals.r
Jacinta Moreno, a fifty-six year-old diabetic, lived with and was
65
cared for by Ermina Sanchez and Sanchez's three children.
Despite the beneficence of this impoverished family, the entire
Sanchez household was denied food stamps because they cared for
a disabled individual who was not their kin within their home.
Significantly, the Court did not imply a limited statutory
exception that, as applied to households like the Sanchezes, the
1971 Amendments irrationally penalized families for the charitable
act of harboring an incapacitated friend. Instead, striking the 1971
amendment, the Court discerned that the overarching and irrational
Congressional purpose was "to prevent so-called 'hippies' and
66
'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp program."
The Court determined that Congress' distaste for the nonconformist
but lawful lifestyle of "hippies" was an insufficient basis to deprive
otherwise eligible individuals of governmental largesse.67 Because it
failed to promote significantly any legitimate goal, such as making
food more readily available to poor persons, the harm caused by
the 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act outweighed arguable
benefits; thus, the amendment was irrational.68
64. See id. at 529-32.
65. See id. at 531.
66. Id. at 534.
67. Id.
68. It should be accented that, while not necessarily irrelevant in equal protection
litigation, Moreno demonstrates that the challenged classification does not have to address
an 'immutable characteristic" to be deemed irrational. The infirmity in Moreno was not that
the Food Stamp Act penalized certain otherwise eligible recipients because of a
characteristic over which they had little or no control such as skin color. To the contrary,
the household membership standard was unjust because it penalized individuals for choosing
to live lawful lifestyles disliked by certain segments of government. As the Sixth Circuit
underscored a quarter of a century later, "Moreno... involved commune residents; [but] the
principle would be the same if [the government discriminated] based on hair color, a college
bumper sticker (perhaps supporting an out-of-state rival) or an affiliation with a disfavored
sorority or company." Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 1997).
In the interest of thoroughness it should be noted that the Supreme Court has declined to
extend Moreno in a series of subsequent holdings involving food stamps. See generally
Farrell, supra note 23, at 374-82; Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1977) (offering no substantive
discussion of Moreno, and upholding a Department of Agriculture definition of "income"
regarding eligibility for food stamps that included as countable earnings a state
transportation allowance to cover traveling expenses to attend vocational school); Lyng v.
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (sustaining regulations requiring that to be a "household"
eligible to receive food stamps, co-habitating individuals who are either unrelated or
distantly related must "customarily purchase food and prepare meals together."); Lyng v. Int'l
Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (upholding 1981 amendments to the Food Stamp Act disqualifying
entire households from collecting food stamps so long as any member of the household was
on strike).
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Equally significant is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
wherein a unanimous Court invalidated as irrational a zoning
ordinance of Cleburne, Texas, requiring that proposed group homes
for the mentally retarded obtain a special use permit not required
for other group homes. 69 The Cleburne Court determined that
singling out group homes for mentally retarded persons while
placing no special permit requirements on other group homes only
remotely fostered two of the City's purported legitimate goals preventing homes from occupying a five hundred year flood plain
and limiting both the physical size of group homes and the number
of occupants therein. 70
Importantly, the Court rejected as inherently unjust and, thus,
irrational, the prime impetus underlying the Cleburne ordinance
which was "the negative attitude of the majority of property
owners located within 200 feet of the Featherston facility, as well
as the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood." 71 All nine
Justices agreed that discriminatory policies predicated on
misinformation and spurious stereotypes epitomize the type of
arbitrary treatment proscribed by the Constitution's equal
protection clause:
[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not
permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally
retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings
and the like .... "Privatebiases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect. '71
The most significant modem decision overturning official
conduct as unconstitutionally irrational is Romer v. Evans, which
invigorated the Moreno-Cleburne doctrine that fear, disdain and
Granted, the post-Moreno opinions arguably are contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of
Moreno itself. See, e.g., Castio, 477 U.S. at 646 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lyng, 485 U.S. at
380-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Such disagreements are based on normative principles political beliefs - that inform constitutional law. They do not represent a flaw in the
overarching principle of rationality analysis that government acts unlawfully if: (1) a given
policy or practice harms a politically unpopular group, (2) the underlying motive is to harm
that group and (3) there are no countervailing beneficial effects to vindicate the challenged
policy. Indeed, rather than lying fallow, as we shall see shortly, Moreno was rejuvenated by
the Court in Romer, albeit in a context other than eligibility for food stamps.
69. See C/eburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
70. See id. at 449.
71. Id. at 448.
72. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)) (emphasis added).
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political unpopularity are illegitimate bases to legislate against
groups and individuals.73 Romer invalidated "Amendment 2," a
provision of the Colorado Constitution, adopted by popular
referendum in 1992, that repealed all statutes, ordinances and state
precedents specifically prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships."74 Furthermore, Amendment 2 mandated that any civil
rights law specifically protecting gays, lesbians or bisexuals could
be adopted only through amending the state constitution.
The Court aptly rejected as "implausible" Colorado's argument
that Amendment 2 "puts gays and lesbians in the same position as
all other persons ... [and] does no more than deny homosexuals
special rights." 75 Avowedly homosexual individuals and their
supporters alone were prohibited from employing every avenue
except constitutional amendment to champion civil rights
protection of homosexual preferences. By stunning contrast, all
routes of government remained fully open to persons advocating
civil rights laws other than those designed to protect gays and
lesbians from discrimination. The Romer Court concluded that the
overarching purpose of Amendment 2 was to effectuate "animosity
towards the class of affected persons," by denying them the
opportunity to utilize the various branches of government to
protect their interests.7 6 Official enforcement of popular disdain
alone, without a greater justification, is unfair; therefore,
Amendment 2, enacted to handicap the burgeoning societal power
of those who favor civil rights protection for gays and lesbians,
77
was constitutionally irrational.
7
8
These and other cases demonstrate that recourse to fear,
73. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
74. Id. at 624.
75. Id. at 626.
76. Id. at 633, 635.
77. See id. at 634-35 (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
78. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (accenting that "legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing," the Court held that states must
provide public education to children of illegal aliens to the same extent that it provides
education to the children of state citizens and resident aliens); Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 ("[I1t is
invidious to discriminate against [iliegitimates] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of
theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother."); Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977) (invalidating as irrational a portion of the Illinois probate code which limited
the right of an illegitimate child to inherit via intestacy only from the mother's estate);
Esmail, 53 F.3d at 179 (per Posner, J.) (mayor's vindictive refusal to renew qualified
business' liquor license because mayor did not like the owner is unconstitutionally
irrational); Planned Parenthood v. City of Wichita, 729 F Supp. 1282 (D. Kan. 1990).
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prejudice and political unpopularity are illegitimate bases to
disadvantage groups of individuals. Simple concepts of fairness
counsel that the protections provided by due process and equal
protection of the laws become meaningless if the political system,
even if supported by a majority of the electorate, may freely
conderrm the weak or politically ostracized elements of society to
suffer disadvantageous treatment for reasons no better than the
very helplessness which gives rise to that disparate treatment.79
3. Governmental Action May Be Unlawful If It Creates Or
Threatens to Create a Caste System
Addressing concerns related to the irrationality of making and
enforcing policies based on unfounded fears, misconceptions,
stereotypes and animus, the courts emphasize that official conduct
may be irrational if it creates or threatens to create a caste system
within society. The pivotal case on this point is Zobel v. Williams,80
wherein the Court struck a 1980 legislative program of Alaska that
paid monetary "dividends" to Alaska citizens based on the duration
of their residency. Residents received one dividend share - the
value of which was legislatively established on an annual basis for each year of their residency since 1959, the year of Alaska's
statehood.8'
Although the residency provisions implicated infringement of the
fundamental "right to travel" and, therefore, suggested the use of
"strict scrutiny analysis," the Court refrained from relying on that
fundamental right, ruling instead that the statutory classification
lacked a rational basis.8 2 The Zobel majority, speaking through
conservative Chief Justice Burger, agreed that linking the number
of dividend shares to the duration of residency advanced the goal
of expressing the State's gratitude for the perseverance and loyalty
of its longest term citizens; nonetheless, the goal itself was
impermissibly irrational because a state may not link the
apportionment of services or the distribution of largesse to either
79. The foregoing protection applies even if the discrimination is imposed only against
one or a very small number of individuals. See, e.g., Village of Wilobrook, 120 S. Ct. at 1075
(homeowning couple stated a cognizable equal protection claim by asserting that village's
requirement that couple grant a 33-foot easement to connect to water supply was "irrational
and wholly arbitrary" when other homeowners were required to deed only a 15-foot
easement).
80. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
81. Id. at 57.
82. Id. at 63. Justice O'Connor concurred on the grounds that the Alaska dividend plan
infringed upon the "right to travel." Id. at 71-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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previous tax payments or the intangible contributions made by
residents.83 As explained by the Court:
If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend
on length of residence, what would preclude varying university
tuition on a sliding scale based on years of residence or even
limiting access to finite public facilities, eligibility for student
loans, for civil service jobs, or for government contracts by
length of domicile? Could states impose different taxes based
on length of residence? Alaska's reasoning could open the
door to state apportionment of other rights, benefits, and
services according to length of residence. It would permit the
states to divide citizens into expanding numbers of permanent
classes. Such a result would be clearly impermissible.84
Three terms later in Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, an
opinion likewise authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court
extended Zobel to invalidate a New Mexico statute awarding a
$2000 property tax exemption to veterans of the Vietnam War who
had been residents of the state prior to May 8, 1976.85 The Court
accented the principle that even though governmental preferences
for veterans may be legitimate, discrimination between classes of
Vietnam veterans based on the commencement date of state
residency is unconstitutionally irrational:
[Ilt is difficult to grasp how New Mexico residents serving in
the military suffered more than residents of other States who
served, so that the latter would not deserve the benefits a
State bestows for national military service. Moreover, the
legislature provided this economic boon years after the
dislocation occurred. Established state residents, by this time,
presumably had become resettled in the community and the
modest tax exemption hardly bears directly on the transition
to civilian life long after the war's end. Finally, the benefit of
the tax exemption continues for the recipient's life. The annual
exemption, which will benefit this limited group of resident
veterans long after the wartime disruption dissipated, is a
continuing bounty for one group of residents rather than
86
simply an attempt to ease the veteran's return to civilian life.
83. Id. at 63 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 632-33 and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
449-50 (1973)).
84. Id. at 64 (footnotes omitted).
85. See Hooper v. Bernalilo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).

2001

A Plea for Rationality and Decency

The Hooper Court concluded with this remonstrance of compelling
poignancy:
The State may not favor established residents over new
residents based on the view that the State may take care of
'its own,' if such is defined by prior residence. Newcomers...
become the State's 'own' and may not be discriminated against
solely on the basis of their [subsequent] arrival in the
state . . .87
Four terms after Hooper in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Commission, a unanimous Court struck as irrational the
tax valuation scheme for commercial property in Webster County,
West Virginia. 8 Specifically, the tax assessor "valued petitioner's
real property on the basis of its recent purchase price, but made
only minor modifications in the assessments of land which had not
been recently sold ....
[As a result,] [f]or the years 1976 through
1982, [petitioner] was assessed and taxed at approximately
thirty-five times the rate applied to owners of comparable
property."89 Although "rough equality" is all that equal protection
requires in tax assessment cases,9° the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Rehnquist, determined that such gross and
long-standing disparities were irrational. 91 "[T]he fairness of one's
allocable share of the total property tax burden can only be
meaningfully evaluated by comparison with the share of others
similarly situated relative to their property holdings." 92 Thus,
Allegheny stands for the principle that the government cannot
create a caste of property owners compelled to carry an
unreasonably heavy share of the relevant community's overall tax
burden. 93
86. Id. at 621.
87. Id. at 623. See also, e.g., Attorney General v. Santo-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986)
(plurality opinion striking down, under heightened scrutiny, New York's civil service
employment preference for resident veterans provided if they commence military service
after establishing state residency).
88. See Allegheny PittsburghCoal Co., 488 U.S. at 346.
89. Id. at 338, 341.
90. Id. at 343.
91. Id. at 343. The Court, therefore, differentiated AUegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. from
cases concerning a constitutional, "transitional delay in adjustment of assessed value..
Id.
92. Id. at 346.
93. See also, e.g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946); Cumberland Coal
Co. v. Bd. of Revision , 284 U.S. 23 (1931) (tax assessor unconstitutionally assessed all coal
in the same township at the identical rate despite differences in value of coals and costs of
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Zobel, Hooper and Allegheny fit the framework of rationality
suggested by this essay. Creating classes for the sake of creating
classes threatens to impair the individuality, dignity and self-worth
protected by the equal protection components of the Constitution.
The creation of such castes forces the individual to alter chosen
behavior or forgo state largesse, if indeed the classification even
affords the individual the opportunity to deliberately plan in
advance whether or not to perform certain acts or accept state
services.
It is noteworthy that the classifications in Zobel and Hooper
were not drafted for invidious purposes. Apparently, the Alaska
and New Mexico legislatures did not intend to create hostile and
conflicting castes in society by differentiating among long-time
residents in the former and certain classes of Vietnam veterans in
the latter. Nevertheless, the lack of untoward motives did not
mitigate the unintended actual and potential disparate effects that
overshadowed any arguable benefits arising from the statutory
operations and transportation); Sioux City Bridge Co, 260 U.S. at 445 (government may not
intentionally discriminate in tax assessments among similarly situated taxpayers); Sunday
Lake Iron, 247 U.S. at 352-53.
In 1992, the Court declined to extend Allegheny PittsburghCoal to invalidate California's
controversial 1978 referendum "Proposition 13." See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 18. In response
to the rapid rise in property values, California voters enacted Proposition 13, an amendment
to the state constitution, that, inter alia, (1) capped property taxes at 1% of properties'
1975-1976 assessed cash value, (2) set a 2% cap on all realty's annual increase in cash value
over the 1975-1976 assessment, but (3) subject to limited exceptions, property that changed
ownership could be reassessed at the purchase value. See id. at 4-6. Proposition 13
understandably produced huge disparities in the property tax base of homes of equal market
value located within a particular community. As an example, for tax year 1988-1989,
Nordlinger paid $1701 while a similarly situated neighbor paid $358, less than a quarter of
the amount Nordlinger was taxed. Id. at 6-8.
The Court held that despite the grossly unequal burdens, the benefits of Proposition 13
overrode the disadvantages. The reduction of property taxes promoted community stability
because lower income families and "mom and pop" businesses which had purchased
property at relatively low cost were not forced to relocate due to onerous taxes predicated
on unexpected escalations of property values. Moreover, the Court reasoned that, unlike a
long-time owner who may be significantly encumbered by a sudden sharp increase in taxes,
a potential purchaser knows what her tax base will be and can budget accordingly or forego
the purchase. Id. at 12-13. According to the Justices' analysis, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal,
which concerned the disparate taxing only of certain large parcels of commercial realty, did
not present the same prevailing concerns of community preservation, business vitality and
protection of homeowners. Id. at 14-16.
Justice Stevens dissented alone, arguing that Proposition 13 unconstitutionally creates a
caste system - a class of entrenched property owners who, regardless of actual necessity,
enjoy an extraordinary tax advantage simply because they had bought property before 1978.
He could discern no meaningful factual or theoretical distinctions in Nordlinger to make
inapplicable the law of Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, particularly because Proposition 13
covered the entire State of California. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 28-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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schemes. The controlling core principle is fairness - if after
assessing the benefits and the detriments, one concludes that the
challenged policy promotes more unfairness than fairness, the
policy is unconstitutionally irrational.
Having established a framework delineating "rationality" under
the Equal Protection Clause, this article turns next to a discussion
of the numerous forms of disparate treatment imposed by
American law schools on their legal writing faculties. 94 Then, the
article debunks the purported justifications underlying the disparate
treatment.9 5 The article concludes by recalling the Supreme Court's
standards for determining rationality to show that the
discriminatory terms and conditions of employment foisted on
writing professors are unfair and, thus, contrary to the standards of
6
ethics that law schools pledge to uphold
III.

THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF LEGAL WRITING PROFESSORS

Among all full-time members of law school faculties, only legal
writing teachers are subjected to systemic and persistent inequality
ranging from remarkably disadvantageous terms of employment to
97
disdain and segregation within their own law school societies.
With the endorsement, if not outright encouragement, of the
American Bar Association ("ABA"), most law schools impose on
legal writing professors a wide assortment of conditions distinctly
and deliberately less desirable than those enjoyed by other full-time
law teachers. Exceptions are rare indeed. 98 Reviewing the literature,
94. See infra, Part III.
95. See infra, Part IV.
96. See infra, Part V.
97. This essay concerns the treatment of full-time legal writing professors. Virtually
every law school requires students to take a formal legal analysis, research and writing
course as part of their formative education during their crucial first year of law school.
Uncommon among required courses, especially first year courses, not all legal writing
programs are staffed by full-time professors. Indeed, although the predominant model, the
use of full-time faculty is by no means the only common structure for this integral course.
According to a recent survey conducted by the Legal Writing Institute, of 145 responding
law schools, 125 (86%) employ full-time legal writing professors, although a small number of
those programs also utilize adjunct instructors, students-instructors or both. LEGAL WRIrIG
INsTrruTE, 2000 SURVEY REsuLTs questions 10, 11 (on file with author) [hereinafter 2000
Survey]. See also, e.g., Jan M. Levine, Leveling the Hill of Sisyphus: Becoming a Professor of
Legal Writing, 26 FLA ST. U. L REv. 1067, 1090 (1999) ("A small and ever-shrinking number
of law schools employ adjuncts to teach legal writing. Those that do are usually found in
urban areas where the pool of talented lawyers is quite large.")
98. Of course, not all law schools impose every conceivable form of disparate
treatment onto their legal writing teachers. As described below, some schools allow their
writing faculties certain perquisites and opportunities denied to similarly situated teachers at
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Professor Ilhyung Lee, formerly a legal writing teacher, aptly noted,
"[legal research and writing 'gets no respect,' has been 'trivialized,
demeaned and diluted,' and is a subject of 'institutionalized
contempt.' "99 In particular, writing faculties are subjected to six
distinct although interrelated forms of disparate treatment.
A. Adverse ContractualStatus
The first mode of discrimination consists of the myriad
disadvantageous terms of employment exacted on full-time legal
writing professors solely because of their rank. Perhaps most
importantly, very few programs permit writing professors to seek
tenure, that most prized source of professional security and
acknowledgment of excellence. It is no secret that tenure ranks
high among benefits enjoyed by undergraduate and graduate
professors. 1°° Indeed, tenure is integral to safeguarding academic
freedom and a robust variety of scholarship. 01' 1 Similar to
partnership in a law firm, tenure is the Academy's reward to
journeyman teachers, imparting a high measure of respect and
valuable employment security; thus, it encourages teachers to attain
their full potential no matter how unique, challenging or
controversial their studies may be.'0 2
Tenure is the right of passage from apprenticeship to fellowship
in the community of scholars. Any full-time teacher who cannot
compete for tenure can never be a complete or fully respected
member of her academic society. Such a teacher, no matter how
credentialed, dedicated and accomplished, will always be an
outsider if not an outcast - not quite a stranger, but never an
esteemed colleague. 1°3 The number of law schools willing to tenure
qualified legal writing professors, however, is few.1 4 According to
other institutions.
99. Ilhyung Lee, The Rookie Season, 39 SANTA CLARA L REV. 473, 489 (1999) (footnotes
and citations omitted). See also, e.g., Arrigo, supra note 2, at 143, 148 & n.136.
100. See, e.g., Association of American University Professors Reports, The Status of
Non-Tenure-Track Faculty (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.aaup.org/rbnonten.htm>
[hereinafter Status].
101. See id.
102. As emphasized by the ABA, "[tienure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1)
freedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of
economic security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability." ABA
Standards, Appendix 1 (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/ legaled/appendix.html
103. See Status, supra note 100.
104. See J. Christopher Rideout and Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View,
69 WASH. L. REV. 35, 87 (1994); 2000 SURVEY, supra note 97, at questions 10, 11; Legal Writing
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the Legal Writing Institute's Year 2000 Survey, of 143 law school
respondents, 16 (11%) tenure track their writing professors. 105
Along lines similar to the tenure issue, some law schools
continue to limit the number of years any given individual may be
employed as a legal writing professor.106 Although the large majority
of schools no longer impose a ceiling on the number of years LRW
professors may remain employed,107 most schools limit writing
08
professors' contracts to renewable 1, 2 or, perhaps, 3 year terms.
The denial of explicit job security reinforces the notion that such
faculty members are not truly part of the academic community.
Commensurate with the lack of security are the low salaries paid
to even the most experienced, effective and credentialed writing
professors. The matter of salary has never been a picayune affair in
legal education. In fact, until a recent litigation settlement, the ABA
made generous salaries for tenure-track professors a necessary but
not sufficient standard for law school accreditation. °0 Needless to
Institute, 1998 Survey Results questions 4, 5 (on file with author) [hereinafter 1998 survey]..
105. 2000 Survey, supra note 97, at question 65. A few more schools tenure track their
legal writing directors. Of 82 schools responding that they employ a director, 34 (42%) are on
tenure-track or are tenured. See id. at question 45. Other surveys reveal similar results.
According to Professor Levine "[it] seems safe to say . . . that approximately 40 of the 180
ABA-accredited law schools have on their faculties tenured or tenure-track legal writing
professionals who did not come to legal writing after being tenured as 'doctrinal' law
professors." Levine, supra note 97, at 1075-76 n.31. Another survey found that of 182
responding schools, roughly 49 (27%) employed tenure-track professors to direct their legal
writing programs. See LRW PRoGRAM DESIGN AND FAcuLTY STATUS (May 10, 1999) (Program
Design Survey) (on file with author). Of those, approximately 17 directors were doctrinal or
clinical professors for whom directing LRW was an additional assignment. Id.
106. See Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 104, at 38 n.8. These contract "caps" are
based on the disparaging and misinformed belief that writing "instructors would only wish to
teach LRW for a year or two and then would move on since . . . the entrenched viewpoint
was that no self-respecting intelligent lawyer would be able to endure the job for long."
Arrigo, supra note 2, at 145.
107. See Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century: A Sharper
Image, 2 J. LEGAL WRITING 1, 14 (1996) ("eighteen percent of legal writing professors stay
over ten years. Seventy-four percent of the schools responding do not impose a limit on the
number of years legal writing faculty can stay."). According to the .2000 Survey, supra note
97, at question 66, 11 schools "capped" the number of years it would employ any given
writing professor. The 1998 Survey, supra note 104, at question 12, reveals similar results.
See also, e.g., Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 104, at 145-46.
108. Some schools do allow longer term contracts. See 2000 Survey, supra note 97, at
questions 65 and 66.
109. As the ABA itself explained:
DOJ CONSENT DECREE. In June 1995, the United States Department of Justice filed a
civil antitrust suit against the ABA, alleging violations of antitrust laws in the
accreditation program ....
The civil suit was concluded by a final consent decree
that was approved in June 1996. It includes a number of requirements concerning the
Standards, many of which reflect revisions that the ABA had previously adopted.
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say, comparatively low salaries adversely

affect the financial

security of legal writing professors in addition to stigmatizing them
as unworthy of full professional respect and approval. The income

for

an

inexperienced,

incoming

assistant

professor,

without

consideration of insurance, retirement accounts and other fringe

benefits, usually is no less than $60,000 and may be considerably
more. The pay allotted a well experienced and effective legal
writing professor, by contrast, often is barely half as much.
"Salaries for most legal writing professors average less than

$35,000, much less than for professors and clinicians at the same
schools." 110
More recent data evince little change. The 2000 Survey of the

Legal Writing Institute revealed that the average salary for writing
professors ranges from $42,202 tp $49,261.111 Traditionally, directors

of legal writing programs are paid more than
professors

because

of

the

administrative

work

legal writing
and

other

responsibilities unique to the director's position."2
Even so,
directors' salaries infrequently surpass those of tenure-track
professors. During my fifth and final year as director of St. Thomas'
program, my wages were less than those paid to an incoming
3
assistant professor."
In addition to salaries, tenure and job security, legal writing

faculty are disparately treated regarding other significant terms of
employment. Many writing professors are physically segregated in

offices away from the main faculty wing. Offices for LRW teachers
often are small, windowless and unattractive, particularly compared
Among them are that compensation paid to faculty, deans, or staff may not be
considered or even collected by the ABA in the accreditation process. An exception is
permitted where there is a complaint about discrimination ....
ABA Standards, Forward (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
Foreword.htnl>.
110. Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 104, at 37 n.5. Similarly, analyzing 1994
statistics, Professor Arrigo wrote, "Fifty-one schools among those responding to the 1994
survey pay their LRW teachers at least $30,000 less per year than they pay their non-LRW/
non-clinical faculty." Arrigo, supra note 2, at 146.
111. 2000 Survey, supra note 97, at question 75. Legal writing salaries ranged from a
low of $26,000 to a high of $90,000. See id. In 1999, the average pay ranged from $39,689 to
$47,452. See id.
112. See Levine, supra note 97, at 1107-10; 1998 Survey, supra note 104.
113. According to the 2000 Survey, supra note 97, at question 49, the average director's
salary for a 12 month contract is $77,053 and for a 9 - 10 month contract, $74,697, making a
combined average of $75,806. The minimum reported salary was $20,000 and the maximum
was $130,000. The higher salaries, not surprisingly, were paid to tenure-track directors.
Non-tenure-track directors averaged a compensation of $62,255.
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with the facilities provided for other faculty." 4 I recall discussing
the office situation with the now former dean at the outset of my
second year as director of legal writing. Several offices had opened
in the main faculty suite for which there were no takers. I asked
the Dean if the legal writing professors could be moved from their
downstairs location into the spacious and more pleasant setting of
the faculty wing where we could better integrate ourselves with the
other teachers. The Dean responded that the faculty did not relish
the idea of locating the offices of legal writing teachers near them
nor did they want the distraction of a "parade of students" who
might frequent the offices of writing professors. Gesturing towards
the floor, the Dean opined in a patronizing tone, "You're better off
congregated downstairs in your own offices away from the rest of
the faculty."
The Dean's meaning was blunt though eloquent: the tenure-track
professors did not want to associate with those they considered
their inferiors. I drew that conclusion because the Dean's ostensible
nondiscriminatory justification, that the presence of writing faculty
would spawn excessive student traffic throughout the faculty suite,
is not credible. One reason faculty have offices is to make
themselves conveniently available to students. While the number of
student visits to the offices of legal writing professors may be more
than the number of visits to other faculty, visits are not so
excessive, relentless, or disruptive as to shatter the routine and
5
productivity of the faculty suite."
A different but particularly important mode of discrimination is
the way that most law schools do not allow writing professors to
take part in faculty governance. "[Writing faculty] typically have no
114. According to the 2000 Survey, supra note 97, at question 69, approximately 4396 of
76 responding schools segregate their writing professors from other faculty. Sixty-seven
respondents stated that their offices are "comparable to most non-writing faculty offices."
Sixty-six responded that their offices were either smaller than or in less desirable locations
than other faculty.
115. The number of student conferences may increase just before assignments are due
or during designated conference periods. At such times, however, students usually make
specific appointments. Therefore, they do not congregate in large numbers outside the
writing professor's door. While waiting, students are expected to conduct themselves quietly.
Any students who are loud, rude or disorderly may be compelled to leave.
It is noteworthy that at St Thomas the clinical faculty have offices in the main faculty
wing, as did the Director of Academic Support. Clinicians and the Director of Academic
Support are expected to have frequent meetings with students. Indeed, clients and other
third parties often visit the clinical faculty yet their presence is not anathema to the faculty
as a whole. For these reasons, I believe the Dean's position amounts to nothing more than
disrespect for writing faculty.
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vote at faculty meetings. Voting or not, they frequently feel they are
denied a real voice because, having little to no power, their views
are deemed unworthy of notice by the voting faculty."116 Even when
allowed'to attend faculty meetings and, perhaps, express their
opinions, the right to participate in governance is withheld from the
majority of writing professors just as one might indulge and even
be persuaded by the opining of a child, but would never permit
that child any genuine authority in family matters.
The power of the faculty to set policy, manage the curriculum
and otherwise fashion the law school's educative and scholarly
society is integral to professional status and respect among law
professors. Moreover, faculty governance helps assure the
independence of a law school from domination by its university or
some other overarching entity.11 7 Just as faculty governance is
essential to the autonomy of a law school, so is the right to
participate in governance crucial to the professional status of each
8
faculty member."
To be deprived of the right to vote, therefore, is a particularly
demeaning snub because the absence of the franchise implies that
legal writing professors lack the intelligence, the dedication, the
experience and the sagacity of tenure-track faculty. In particular, I
116. Arrigo, supra note 2, at 150. Of 38 schools responding, well over half, 21 schools,
do note allow writing professors to vote at faculty meetings. 1998 Survey Results, supra note
104, at question 103. More recent data show little improvement. For academic year
1999-2000, of 96 responding schools, 39 (41%) allow writing faculty to vote at faculty
meetings, although 23 of these (24%) do not permit writing teachers to vote on hiring,
promotion and tenure. Forty-seven (49%) schools allow writing faculty to attend meetings
without voting rights. Ten do not permit writing teachers to attend at all. See 2000 Survey,
supra note 97, at question 84.
117. ABA Standard 404(3) sets as a faculty responsibility the ongoing and meaningful
"participation in the governance of the law school .. . ." ABA Standards (visited Aug. 19,
1999) <http'J/www.abanet.org/legaled/chapter4.html>.
Similarly, the BYLAWS OF THE
AssOcIAnON OF AMERICAN LAW ScHOOLS, INc. (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.aals.org/
bylaws.htmi>, at section 6-6(a)-(c), state that "[a] member school shall vest in the faculty
primary responsibility for determining institutional policy," including faculty and decanal
hiring, promotion, renewal, tenure and termination decisions. Indeed, according to the
Supreme Court, faculties that govern their respective law schools by, inter alia, setting
academic and institutional policies and handling employment decisions, should be classified
as supervisors or managerial employees who have no federal statutory right to collectively
bargain pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
118. Meaningful citizenship for full-time faculty members is accorded, in substantial
part, by the franchise at faculty meetings. "It is apodictic that the right to vote is a right that
helps preserve all other rights." Werme v. Merrill, 84 F3d 479, 483 (1st Cir. 1996); see also,
e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). To borrow from the Supreme Court, "[tihe
right to vote freely [on matters of faculty governance] is of the essence of a democratic [law
school] society." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
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have heard some faculty members argue that legal writing
professors do not have a substantial conunitment or dedication to
their law schools. 1 9 Thus, writing faculty, like students, are
considered sojourners as opposed to citizens of the school.
The foregoing sentiment might have minimal validity for those
law schools imposing severely restrictive caps on the number of
years writing faculty may hold their jobs. For the large majority of
schools that properly do not cap contracts, 120 however, it cannot be
argued cogently that writing faculty are estranged from the life of
the law school and, thus, should be denied the faculty franchise. To
the contrary, no less than other faculty, legal writing teachers view
the law school as their house, teaching as their calling, the
education of students as their primary duty, loyalty to the
institution as a trust, and professional demeanor as a fundamental
requisite. For full-time writing professors, the law school is the axis
of their professional lives. There is no reason to believe that legal
writing faculty will take governance responsibilities less seriously
or that they will be less wise, just or pragmatic than other full-time
professors. 2 '
Along similar lines, many schools still do not permit legal writing
faculty to sit on law school committees 122 and will not provide legal
writing faculty with research stipends, travel allowances or student
research assistants.'2 3 Some schools discourage students from
24
addressing writing teachers with the title of respect, "professor."'
119. This is reminiscent of disparaging remarks reported by others, such as,"only 'an
incompetent or a borderline crackpot' could have an interest in a long-term commitment to
teaching the subject . . . [for] 'no intelligent J.D. with academic aspirations really wants to
teach a subject like LRW that is beneath the dignity of a law professor.' " Lee, supra note 99,
at 490 (quoting Jack Achtenberg, Legal Writing and Research: The Neglected Orphan of the
First Year, 29 U. MIAM L REV. 218, 218 (1975)).
120. See notes 106-08, supra, and accompanying text.
121. St. Thomas does not permit legal writing faculty to vote; by contrast, aside from
personnel matters, visiting faculty are permitted to vote on all issues at St. Thomas Law
School faculty meetings. Granted, some visitors are being feted for promotion to full-time,
tenure-track positions. Nevertheless, visiting faculty by their nature are "visitors" who very
likely will remain for only a year and move on. Surely, visitors' connections with, knowledge
of and dedication to the visited law school are significantly more attenuated than the loyalty
of full-time writing professors for whom the law school is professional home and hearth.
122. During academic year 1999-2000, roughly one-third of responding schools (34 out
of 108) did not allow writing teachers to serve on committees or withheld voting privileges
from those who did. 2000 Survey, supra note 97, at question 83.
123. According to the 2000 Survey, supra note 97, at question 76, of the 88 schools that
provide summer research stipends to faculty, 33 (37.5%) include writing teachers as eligible.
Of 97 responding schools, fully 89 (92%) provide funding for professional development of
writing faculty through such means as attendance at conferences. See id. at question 79.
124. Lee, supra note 99, at 491; see also Arrigo, supra note 2, at 150. Writing faculty
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Many law schools do not allow writing faculty to teach outside of
that genre although, like tyro assistant professors, most commence
their teaching careers with years of experience in practice and
many bring the additional benefits of advanced degrees such as
LL.M.'s, M.A.'s, and Ph.D's. As one commentator noted,
[Being denied the opportunity to teach outside of legal
writing] can retard future academic opportunities. As regular
tenure-track faculty, visitors, and even adjuncts who teach
non-LRW courses increase their repertoire of course offerings,
they increase their human capital value, since they learn more
about the pedagogy of teaching various types of courses and
learn more about the subject matter they are teaching ....
They gain exposure to a wider range of topics that might
125
spark their interest in scholarship.
When discussing the employment terms and the attendant
prestige of writing professors, it is vital to emphasize that the
disparate contractual treatment of legal writing professors occurs
with the knowledge and, indeed, the express approval of the
American Bar Association, the institution of legal professionals
entrusted to set the standards for both minimal excellence and
ethical practice that all law schools must maintain to be accredited
academies of legal education. Through a series of promulgated
"Standards," the ABA announces the criteria necessary for
accreditation. 126 The ABA Standards applicable to legal writing
faculty merely state:
(a) A law school shall establish and maintain conditions
adequate to attract and retain a competent faculty
are addressed as "professor" at St. Thomas. Their names, however, are not listed with other
professors under the heading "School of Law Faculty." Rather they are enumerated
separately under the designation, "Legal Writing Faculty." See ST. THOMAS UNmvEPsrrY SCHOOL
OF LAW CATALOG 61-62 (1999-2000).
125. Arrigo, supra note 2, at 146 (footnote omitted). According to the 2000 Survey,
supra note 97, at question 85, of 124 responding schools, 25 (20%) do not allow writing
professors to teach any course but first-year legal writing and 37 (30%) permit writing
professors to teach upper level writing, but no "substantive" courses. Thus, about 50% of
schools do allow writing teachers to teach outside of that discipline, although 41 limit such
teaching to summer sessions. A significant number of schools do not pay writing teachers
full-time faculty rates for such additional work.
126. "Since 1952 the [ABAs] Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar has been approved by the U.S. Department of Education as the recognized
national agency for the accreditation of professional schools of law . . . . The Standards
describe the requirements a law school must meet to obtain and retain ABA approval." ABA
Standards, Forward (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www. abanet.org/legaled/Foreword.html>.
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(d)

Under Standard 405(a), law schools employing full-time
legal writing instructors or directors shall provide
conditions sufficient to attract well-qualified legal writing
127
instructors or directors.

One need not have completed a year of legal writing to
immediately recognize that Standard 405(d) provides neither
specific benefits nor protections for writing teachers and certainly
does not encourage trappings of respect such as tenure, multi-year
contracts, professional level salaries or a meaningful voice in the
governance of the law school community. Indeed, the plain
language of Standard 405(d) requires virtually nothing on the part
of law schools. Even under the adverse employment conditions
attending most legal writing programs, the joy and fulfillment of
teaching, the opportunity to conduct scholarly inquiry, the respect
those outside the academy accord to anyone who teaches law and
the unrelenting pressure of full-time law practice make positions in
legal writing sufficiently attractive to lure not just "well-qualified"
but exceptionally well-qualified writing faculty. Law schools, then,
may impose the unkind employment conditions above described
with complete professional impunity. 28 In this way, the ABA
underscores and legitimizes the prevailing institutional prejudice
that legal writing faculty are not to be accorded the dignity, respect
127. ABA Standard 405(a), (d) (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
chapter4.html>.
128. By arresting contrast, Standard 405(c) accords significant security to the clinical
faculty, the other class of full-time teachers routinely denied tenure-track status:
A law school shall afford to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security of
position reasonably similar to tenure, and non-compensatory perquisites reasonably
similar to those provided other full-time faculty members. A law school may require
these faculty members to meet standards and obligations reasonably similar to those
required of other full-time faculty members ....
ABA Standard 405(c) (visited Aug. 19, 1999) < http://www.abanet.org/legaled/chapter4.html>.
The ABA has explicated and fortified this provision with Interpretation 405-6 that includes
the important admonition that contracts for tenure may only be revoked for "good cause."
ABA Interpretation 405-6 (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
chapter4.html>. Along similar lines, ABA Interpretation 405-8 states, subject to limited
exceptions that "[a] law school shall afford to full-time clinical faculty members an
opportunity to participate in law school governance in a manner reasonably similar to other
full-time faculty members." ABA Interpretation 405-7 (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://
www.abanet.org/legaled/chapter4.html>. Legal writing, by contrast, receives no similar
encouragement from the ABA. No extant provision demands that writing faculty be
afforded job security or allowed meaningful participationin governing the law school.
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and opportunities due all other full-time faculty members.129
B. Ridicule
In addition to poor terms of employment, writing teachers are
subject to ridicule and deprecation. Professor Arrigo caustically
observed that law schools justify the poor treatment of writing
faculty and the limited resources allotted to writing programs "by
denigrating LRW as a field of legitimate academic interest and, by
implication, criticizing and belittling anyone [who] finds the field
worthy of her full personal attention."130 One writing professor,
preferring anonymity, recounted, "I did not realize that writing
instructors are not real people. The dean and faculty seem to go
out of their way to denigrate and exclude us . . . . Many of the
13
faculty do not even bother to learn our names." '
129. As of this writing, the ABA has published proposed revisions to Standard 405
which, if adopted, would accord legal writing teachers scarcely more protection. Proposed
Standard 405(b) states:
(b) A law school shall have established and announced policies designed to afford
full-time faculty members, including clinical and legal writing faculty, whatever
security of position and other rights and privileges of faculty membership as may be
necessary to (i) attract and retain a competent faculty, (ii) provide students with a
program of legal education that satisfies the requirements of Chapter 3 of these
Standards, and (iii) safeguard academic freedom. The form and terms of security of
position and other rights and privileges of faculty membership may vary with the
duties and responsibilities of different faculty members.
Proposed ABA Standard 405 (b) (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
chapter4.html>.
Significantly, the standard does not prescribe that writing and clinical faculties be treated
alike or substantially alike. Indeed, the ABA:s Interpretation 405-2, discussing Proposed
Standard 405(b), holds that "[a]ttraction and retention of competent clinical faculty
members presumptively requires a form of security of position, appropriate opportunities to
participate in law school governance, and other rights and privileges of faculty membership
that are reasonably similar to that provided to full-time non-clinical faculty members."
(Emphasis added). Interpretation 405-2 then details the substantial protections afforded by a
"separate tenure track" or "renewable long-term contracts." Legal writing faculty are nowhere
mentioned in any of the Interpretations and there are no ABA statements requiring, urging or
even suggesting that writing programs should include a tenure-track equivalent, rolling,
long-term contracts, salaries based upon the work performed or votes at faculty meetings. It
may be presumed that even if enacted, the revised Standard 405 will dispense frigid comfort
to writing faculty.
130. Arrigo, supra note 2, at 143.
131. SECOND DAtrr, LEGAL WRrrING INsrrrurE 6 (Mar. 1994); see also, e.g., Mary E. Gale,
Legal Writing: The Impossible Takes a Little Longer, 44 ALB. L REv. 298, 317-18 (1980)
("Nearly everyone who writes about legal writing duly records faculty disdain for the subject
matter and administrative dislike of the expense."). Even tenure-track faculty who might be
supportive or who harbor no overt hostility to writing faculty tend to be condescending.
"Non-LRW instructors frequently make comments like, 'You know, I have no idea what you
people do over in the legal writing department.' When asked, 'Would you like to know,
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The derision by faculty and administrators certainly is well
known to law students, thereby undermining the authority and
respect writing professors bring to their classrooms. Faculty have
been known to advise their students that legal writing is relatively
unimportant and should not be taken seriously as contrasted with
"substantive courses." 132 Disrespect from the faculty and
administration, coupled with observable discrepancies of status,
send a resolute message that students need not accord their writing
professors the same regard as they do other faculty.
This disparagement and low esteem severely limit the likelihood
for advancement when writing faculty attempt to seek tenure-track
teaching positions within or outside their law schools. Indeed, the
experience acquired from teaching legal writing may be detrimental
in the greater teaching market. Hiring committees often consider
writing professors poor candidates for tenure-track on the
fallacious presumption that only lackluster, if not inferior, teachers
would consent to be writing instructors.w The prejudice attached
to teaching legal writing often is a bar too high to hurdle in the job
market. 134
C. Undue Criticism
Because writing programs are held in low esteem and writing
faculties are deemed unworthy of respect, programs and teachers
are subject to attacks and criticisms by faculty and students, alike,
that would never be tolerated if directed at tenured or tenure-track
professors. 3 5 When faculty and administrators denigrate the
importance of legal writing as a curriculum and writing professors
as professionals, students respond to such indicia of disrespect.
They feel free to criticize legal writing for any number of perceived
deficiencies.
The propensity for disparagement is intensified because of the
singular structure of the legal writing course. Unlike most law
school courses that test students via one examination at the end of
the semester, a sound writing program consists of numerous
graded assignments of increasing degrees of complexity. Students
because I'd be happy to tell you?', a common reaction includes glazed eyes and rapid
retreat." Arrigo, supra note 2, at 178.
132. Arrigo, supra note 2, at 143 & n.117.
133. See, e.g., Elyce Zenoff & Jerome A. Barron, So You Want to Hire a Law
Professor?, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 492, 503 (1983).
134. See Lee, supra note 99, at 490; Arrigo, supra note 2, at 147, 175.
135. Arrigo, supra note 2, at 159.
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receive their first law school grades in legal writing - long before
facing the rigors of in-class examinations - and for many students
those grades are an unpleasant shock. Most students, even those
who excelled in college, receive "Cs" or "Bs" in legal writing,
possibly the first such grades they have seen in years. For some
students, the demands of numerous and difficult assignments
coupled with the dismay of receiving less than exemplary grades
generates a degree of discontent, even hostility, towards legal
writing faculty. Although many students accept grades and
accompanying detailed assessments of their work with grace and a
professional interest in improvement, others become angry,
confused, and even resentful. Rather than accept their own need to
improve, they blame the quality of instruction.
Indeed, the entire first year curriculum often confuses and
frustrates students. It usually is not until near the end of the first
or second semester that students begin to comprehend the difficult
concepts included in contracts, torts and other introductory
courses. During the weeks before the onset of final examinations,
most students are nervous, unsure that they are comprehending
any of their course of study. Along with this apprehension comes
challenging, time-consuming and utterly unfamiliar types of graded
assignments from the legal writing faculty. Wishing for a vulnerable
target of authority upon which to vent their anxiety, students often
direct the accumulated hostility of the entire semester toward the
only teachers from whom they have received grades, and who, by
coincidence, are the least prestigious faculty, thereby all the more
accessible as scapegoats. Thus, writing professors absorb the brunt
of student bewilderment and disorientation that is inherent in
36
introductory legal studies.
As disheartening as a culture of student criticism may be, more
dismaying is the propensity of faculty and administration to
uncritically accept student grievances about writing programs and
professors. Faculty and deans will bring to directors of writing
programs students' complaints in a confrontational and accusatory
manner indicating their presumption that the students must be
right. Tenure-track faculty often are willing to accept students'
136. This is not to imply that students do not ever have valid complaints about writing
programs or those who instruct them. Of course, programs are imperfect and writing
professors are hardly flawless, just as one might say for "doctrinal" courses and tenure-track
faculty. The point simply is that there is nothing innate about the quality or the import of
either writing programs or writing professors to presume that the amount of criticism that
often occurs is deserved.
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complaints that legal writing is inadequately taught and to express
that opinion to other faculty and to administrators.' 37 By contrast,
tenure-track faculty tend to dismiss or minimize similar grievances
1 38
when expressed against one of their own.
At most law schools, the formal legal writing program is taught
only during the first year after which intense training in research
and writing ceases. 139 Writing programs, then, tend to be judged on
the rather unrealistic basis that if students are not significantly
adept at research and writing by the end of the first year, the
writing program and its instructors are at fault. Thus, faculty with
scant if any appreciation of legal writing pedagogy and the
demands of teaching in that arena will pointedly criticize aspects of
legal writing programs on the mistaken presumption that legal
writing is a simple skill the teaching of which requires little talent,
depth or experience. In sum, unlike "substantive" courses, any
weaknesses in writing programs become emblematic that the
program is structurally unsound, that the writing professors are
inept, or both. Compliments, by contrast, tend to be dismissed as
atypical.' 4°
137. Arrigo supra note 2, at 159 ("Complaints about LRW teachers were sometimes
treated as valid by an administration likely to minimize identical complaints about a
doctrinal professor."). A tenured professor once asked me why citation form is not taught in
legal writing. I assured him that we spend plenty of time on that rather technical matter and
asked him why he thought we did not. He said that one of his students had written a
seminar paper with terrible citation form on simple sources such as judicial opinions. The
student told the teacher that he had not been taught how to cite judicial authority during
first-year legal writing. I was staggered that the tenured professor would simply accept the
student's obviously unlikely excuse that his carelessness was due to the legal writing
program's failure to instruct on citation form. If within that seminar paper the student had
misstated the Parole Evidence Rule, surely the professor would not accept as an explanation
- "My contracts teacher never taught that Rule."
138. See Arrigo, supra note 2, at 159. Tenure-track professors might even take
complaints as an emblem that they are doing their jobs, opining that students always
complain when a course is challenging, the teacher is demanding and the material is
unfamiliar. If students were quiet and happy, one might suspect that the teachers were
"spoon feeding" the lessons, simplifying the curriculum and otherwise making the first year
too easy. Whatever the merits of such arguments, rarely are they used to dispel students'
criticisms of legal writing.
139. Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 110, at 77-78.
140. For instance, one tenured professor came to me with certain complaints she "had
heard" about the teaching effectiveness of one of the writing professors. I noted that I
happened to have judged all of the moot court arguments performed by that professors'
students. Along with the numerous guest judges, I found the students' presentations well
reasoned and sophisticated. The tenured professor scowled and waived away my point,
"Students always do well at moot court." As this professor should have acknowledged, a
writing teacher's class of students can only do well during moot court arguments if they
have been properly trained in legal analysis and oral advocacy.
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D. Exploitation of Writing Faculty
Consistent with the foregoing is the fourth form of
discrimination, schools often exploit writing professors by assigning
them additional work without added compensation, enhanced job
security, or even thanks. Professor Maureen Arrigo described the
pattern:
Without institutional power available for self-protection,
teachers may find themselves assigned by default to undertake
special challenges for which they are not specifically qualified,
trained, or compensated ....
Not only does this work of LRW instructors have an
institutional financial payoff [by imposing on writing faculty
extra responsibilities that otherwise would have to be assumed
by hiring more professional staff], it also has an emotional
payoff that enables faculty and administrators to take partial
credit for things they are not actually doing ....
[The] faculty
and administration are likely to take credit for the students'
sense of contentment - "look what a great job WE are doing
141
for our students."
Professor Arrigo discussed adding to writing faculty duties. Let
me add another example. The St. Thomas program consists of
three rather than two mandatory semesters of legal writing and
analysis. In addition to a traditional first-year curriculum, 142 during
their second semester of their second year, St. Thomas students
take a required "advanced" course designed both to hone the
abilities acquired during the first year and to introduce additional
aspects such as client letters, complaints, answers, discovery
matters, trial-level motions and settlement negotiations.
Formerly, the second-year class was taught by adjuncts practitioners from the Miami area. During the Fall 1997 semester,
certain senior faculty members objected to having adjuncts teach a
required course. The writing professors recognized the sound
pedagogy of taking the course out of the hands of adjuncts even
though many were quite capable instructors. However, we
141. Arrigo, supra note 2, at 165-66 (quoting Susan J. Adams, Because They're
Otherwise Qualified: Accommodating Learning Disabled Law Student Writers, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 189, 207-08 (1996) (footnotes omitted, capitalization of the word "WE" supplied).
142. The familiar organization of the predominant first-year writing course is set forth
at notes 181-85, infra, and within the accompanying text.
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requested the hiring of one or two more writing professors because
of the increased work load.
The Dean agreed that full-time faculty are more appropriate but
refused to increase the number of full-time writing teachers.
Rather, he sent word to the writing faculty that they would teach
the extra course without compensation or their contracts would
not be renewed. Thus, prior to the sudden reorganization of April
2000 described at the outset of this article, the writing professors
instructed an additional two-credit, required writing course, with no
increase in salary, no additional job security and not even a
begrudging "Thank you." I cannot imagine the customary workload
of tenure-track professors being substantially increased without
significant added compensation or other comparable benefits. 14
E.

The Relatively Powerless Legal Writing Director

The fifth form of disparate treatment affects directors of writing
programs. Granted, directors have somewhat more prestige than
other writing teachers, are somewhat more likely to be
tenure-tracked and receive better salaries than the professors they
supervise. 144 However, as Professor Jan Levine cautioned, "Although
[one] . . . may think that a program's director has power, this
power is often illusory, and power is always relative."145 A director
may be held responsible for the problems emanating from legal
writing, but may have no authority to effectuate the pedagogical
and administrative changes needed to alleviate the adverse
conditions.146
F

Sex Discrimination
The foregoing five modes of discrimination concern the adverse

143. Indeed, recently a St. Thomas professor had to take an unexpected semester
leave. Other tenure-track faculty who had prepared and, in fact, were teaching the very
courses during that semester were assigned to conduct the absent teacher's classes. These
faculty were paid sizeable bonuses for handling an extra class for which they did not have to
engage in any substantial extra preparation. Similarly, during the Spring 1999 semester, along
with his usual courses, a tenure-track professor obtained the Dean's permission to teach the
First Amendment. Not only did the professor have the pleasure of expanding his teaching
experience into a new area of a field that he loves, but he was paid a generous stipend
amounting to nearly a third of the salary paid to junior legal writing professors.
144. See Levine, supra note 97, at 1106.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1062-63; see also, e.g., Arrigo, supra note 2, at 181-82 ("The non-tenure-track
LRW program director is likely to fit the powerless leader paradigm . . . . Besides being
isolated, she can be rendered less effective by her lack of institutional status.")
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contractual terms and general derision routinely exacted upon legal
writing faculty based on their status as legal writing faculty. Before
addressing the merits of the purported justifications for the second
class citizenship of writing faculty, one other form of disparate
treatment should be mentioned - sex discrimination. In fact, sex
discrimination apparently explains much of the initial and, perhaps,
continuing motivation for the shameful treatment accorded to legal
writing.
As addressed by Professor Arrigo in her alarming and compelling
article Hierarchy Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal
Writing Programs,147 from their inception, legal writing programs
have been staffed predominately by women - a reflection certainly
more of discriminatory stereotyping than respect.'14 Strikingly, the
tendency towards sequestering female law professors into legal
writing programs is no remnant of a distant past. To the contrary,
as Professor Arrigo noted, according to a 1994 survey, the vast
majority of law schools' writing programs "were staffed by more
than 50% females." 149 Indeed, "the disproportionately high
percentage of women in LRW may have increased over time" as
evinced by a 1992 survey that "showed that only 58% of the 78
schools responding had programs that were more than 50% staffed
by women."15°
For Professor Arrigo, as well as other commentators, 15 1 this is

evidence of irresponsible typecasting if not blatant animus:
It may be that LRW work shares a characteristic common to
work generally assigned to women - that is, the work comes
147. See Arrigo, supra note 2.
148. See id. at 118-21, 149-50, 160-62. See also, e.g., Levine, supra note 112, at 1074.
149. Specifically, according to the 1994 survey conducted by the Legal Writing Institute,
"75% of the 115 schools that responded were staffed by more than 50% females. Forty-one
LRW programs were staffed by between 51% and 75% females; forty-three of the programs
were staffed with between 75% and 100% females." Arrigo, supra note 2, at 120 (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
150. Id. at 120-21 (footnotes omitted). These figures are remarkable when contrasted
with the low percentage of women in more prestigious, tenure-track law professorships.
Although many schools have made sincere efforts to increase the gender diversity of their
faculties, a 1996 ABA report "demonstrate[s] that women held 28% of faculty and
administrative positions in law schools but only 16% of the tenured law school jobs." Arrigo,
supra note 2, at 119. It appears that women are disproportionately ushered into legal writing
positions as contrasted with their numbers in "substantive" law positions.
151. See, e.g., Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women
on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA L REv. 537, 552 (1988); Pamela Edwards,
Teaching Legal Writing as Women's Work: Life on the Fringes of the Academy, 4 Cardozo
WOMEN'S UJ. 75 (1997); Mairi N. Morrison, "May It Please Whose Court": How Moot Court
Perpetuates Gender Bias in the "Real World" of Practice, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 49 (1995).
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to be viewed as a "support" function of the "real work" being
done by men; it may even be viewed not as "work" at all, but
as "behavior" reflecting essential characteristics of women.
Once the work has been thus essentialized, the "work"
becomes invisible and either under-compensated or not
compensated at all.
• . . An essay by University of California Professor Cynthia
Tuell entitled "Teaching as Women's Work," reveals parallels
between the treatment of composition teachers and that of
LRW teachers. Professor Tuell points out that composition
teachers are not considered "normal" or "real" faculty. Rather,
the course is a service course; thus, its teachers are
tantamount to university "handmaids." As handmaids or
housekeepers, the composition teachers clean up the comma
splices, organize student discourse, and generally "unclutter"
the students' writing so that the literature professors can be
provided with papers that are well written and no trouble to
read. No authority is needed for the proposition that
housework commands neither respect nor high wages. 52
Prof. Arrigo's eloquent analysis supports the assertion that many
legal writing programs have been and perhaps remain bulwarks of
sex discrimination through which, by deliberation, tradition or
happenstance, law schools continue to effectuate adverse
contractual terms and other indices of prejudice.1 5
IV.

THE PURPORTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF
LEGAL WRITING FACULTY

To determine if the distinctly discordant terms of employment
152.

Arrigo, supra note 2, at 160-62 (discussing CYNTHIA TuELL, COMPOSmON TEACHING

AS "WOMEN'S WORK": DAUGHTERS, HANDMAIDS, WHORES, AND MOTHERS, in WRITING OURSELVES INTO
THE STORY: UNHEARD VOICES FROM COMPOSITION STUDIES 123 (Sheryl I.Fontaine & Susan Hunter

eds., 1993) (other citations and footnotes omitted).
153. Perusal of the 2000 Survey, supra note 97, Appendix A, intimates that sex
discrimination may still be endemic among writing programs. For instance, the average 12
month salary of female writing directors ($73,171) is 86% of the average salary for male
directors ($84,817). Similarly, the average 9 month salary for female directors is ($70,480)
77% of the male average ($91,182). More specifically, female directors with 0-5 years in their
directorships averaged $66,411, 79% of the $83,786 average salary made by male directors
with 0-5 years in their directorships. Women with 6-10 years in their directorships average
$70,617, 80% of the $88,250 averaged by similarly situated male directors. The data further
indicate that male directors, more than female directors, (1) are likely to be allowed to teach
other courses, (2) are substantially better paid for teaching additional courses, (3) are
allowed to vote at faculty meetings, and (4) are titled "professor."
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exacted on legal writing professors are rational - thus neither
arbitrary, nor illegitimate, nor unfair - one must look at both the
reasons for and the effects of the treatment to discern if the
resultant benefits outstrip the detriments. 1' Law schools raise five
alleged justifications for according writing faculty second class
citizenship: (1) legal writing is not real teaching; (2) writing
professors are not as well credentialed as tenure-track faculty; (3)
writing professors need not produce scholarship; (4) writing
professors do not need the protections of tenure or similar forms
of job security; and (5) law schools cannot fiscally afford to treat
writing faculty like tenure-track faculty even if they deserve to be
so treated. As detailed below, none of these justifications are
meritorious. 15'
A. PurportedJustification-

Legal Writing Is Not Real Teaching

The most prominent and persistent excuse for the disparate
treatment of legal writing faculty is that, as one commentator
ridiculed, teaching legal writing is "donkey work."1 56 Put somewhat
more kindly, "writing is writing." 57 Thus, critics argue, "Legal
writing . . . is merely a matter of remedial writing, existing
primarily to correct what was not learned in undergraduate writing
. . . . Writing instruction then becomes a repetition of what
occurred at the junior high level . . . ."8 Under this crabbed
conception, legal writing is nothing more than a technical course fit
for paralegals in a law school setting - a simple skill, demanding
scant intellectual effort from either the students or the teachers. 5 9
Critics claim that teaching writing is not intellectual because it
consists of imparting set rules, standards and techniques
necessitating modest creativity, imagination and thought. Additional
154. See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
155. Among the forms of disparate treatment, I noted that many writing programs have
been and may continue to be bastions of sex discrimination. See supra notes 147-53 and
accompanying text. No elaborate discussion is required to support the proposition that law
schools act arbitrarily, indeed unlawfully, if any of the disparate terms and conditions of
employment imposed on writing faculty are designed or implemented because a large
percentage of writing faculty are female. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (The
Fair Employment Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of, inter
alia, sex in terms of employment).
156. Willard H. Pedrick, Should Permanent Faculty Teach First-Year Legal Writing? A
Debate, 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 413, 414 (1982).
157. Id. at 413.
158. Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 104, at 41-42 (criticizing "writing is writing"
argument, footnote omitted).
159. See id. at 44-47.
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claims are that writing courses are not intellectually challenging for
students because they require little more than the memorization of
grammatical rules and structural forms attendant to memoranda,
briefs, letters and other species of lawyerly writing. 16 0 To such
critics, instructing the Blue Book - teaching citation form - is
the perfect metaphor to describe the meager conceptual demands
16 1
of the legal writing curriculum as a whole.
If indeed these adverse and degrading impressions of both the
pedagogy and those who teach it were apt, writing instructors
should be accorded terms and conditions of employment less
lucrative and less prestigious than those enjoyed by tenure-track
faculty. Disparate treatment for disparate work is not irrational.16 2
The academy, however, knows or should know that its perceptions
of legal writing programs are wrong. Teaching legal writing is no
less demanding and no less difficult than teaching "substantive
courses;" thus, the rationality of disparate treatment based on
purportedly dissimilar job responsibilities vanishes.
As part of its accrediting standards, the American Bar
Association has emphasized unequivocally that:
[11n order to protect the interests of the public, law students,
and the profession, [an approved law school] must provide an
education program that ensures that its graduates . . . receive
basic education through a curriculum that develops . . . skills
of legal analysis, reasoning, and problem solving; oral and
written communication; legal research; and other fundamental
skills necessary to participate effectively in the legal
profession .... 16
160. "Some go so far as to say that [teaching legal writing] is anti-intellectual because
it distracts students from the real business of learning substantive law by competing with the
rest of the curriculum for their study time. Lurking within this view is also the fear that the
'trade-school' mentality will prevail and that students will learn more about the practical side
of their careers and not enough about the theoretical, which they will never revisit." Rideout
and Ransfield, supra note 104, at 47. See also, e.g., Lee, supra note 99, at 489; Lorne Sossin,
Discourse Politics: Research and Writing's Search for a Pedagogy of Its Own, 29 NEw ENG.
L REV. 883, 883 (1995).
161. Some uninformed critics disparagingly believe that "only 'an incompetent or a
borderline crackpot' could have an interest in a long-term commitment to teaching the
subject... [for] 'no intelligent J.D. with academic aspirations really wants to teach a subject
like LRW that is beneath the dignity of a law professor.' " Lee, supra note 99, at 490
(quoting Jack Achtenberg, Legal Writing and Research: The Neglected Orphan of the First
Year, 29 U. Wou L REv. 218, 218 (1975)).
162. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
163. ABA Standards, Preamble § (2)(ii) (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/preamble.html.>.
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Similarly, in its enumerated standards for the minimum curriculum
acceptable for accreditation, the ABA states, "A law school shall
offer to all students: . . . an educational program designed to
provide its graduates with basic competence in legal analysis and
reasoning, legal research, problem solving, and oral and written
communication; . .
at least one rigorous writing experience;
and . . . adequate opportunities for instruction in professional
skills."16 " Clearly, the ABA recognizes the crucial, overarching
importance that legal writing and research play in the education of
attorneys. It is all the more striking and paradoxical, then, that
the professors assigned to teach the very courses that consolidate
legal writing, research, and analysis are the lest respected, least
privileged members of the faculty.
1. PhilosophicalApproaches to Legal Writing Pedagogy
As commanded by the above-cited ABA Standards, the goals of
the typical first-year program are threefold: to introduce students to
legal analysis, legal research and written and oral legal
communication. It is a challenging and ambitious agenda requiring
no less talent, dedication, professionalism and pure hard work than
the most rigorous "substantive courses." Certainly, a good first year
legal writing course will help students improve their English,
although it cannot be expected to alleviate fully the failings of an
inadequate undergraduate education in composition, style and
grammar. But a legal writing curriculum must be much more than a
recapitulation of undergraduate composition. A proper first year
writing program encapsulates the process of lawyering itself.165 As
the Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple recently stressed:
[W]riting [is] a communal tool, a way by which lawyers can
reason together to resolve differences ....
In short, the legal
164. ABA Standards 302(a)(2)-(4) (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/standards/chapter3.html> (emphasis added). The ABA Proposed Standards, although
amending Standard 302 somewhat, continue to accent the compelling importance of legal
writing, research and analysis. The proposed revisions for Standard 302 read in relevant part:
(a) A law school shall offer to all students in its J.D. program: (1) instruction in the
substantive law, values and skills (including legal analysis and reasoning, legal
research, problem solving and oral and written communication) generally regarded as
necessary to effective and responsible participation in the legal profession; (2) at least
one rigorous writing experience; and (3) adequate opportunities for instruction in
professional skills.
165. See Robert W. Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game Is Over, 13 N.YU. REv. L
& Soc. CHANGE 519 (1985); James C. Raymond, Legal Writing: An Obstruction to Justice, 30
AlA. L REV. 1 (1978); Steven Stark, Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HA~v. L REV. 1389 (1984).
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writing program ought to be a prime venture for inculcating
the new member of our profession with a sense of
responsibility for speaking the truth in a professional world in
which, as Justice Douglas once put it, there are few blacks
and whites; the greys predominate, and even among the greys
the shades are innumerable."'6
A recent scholarly elaboration on the theme of writing as language
explained that "[tihe writing-is-writing position ignores the
linguistic definitions of professional register and discourse
community . . . . Law relies on a new understanding of rhetoric,
schemata, ethics, and language. In law, language is not mere style;
it is itself the law."1 67 In this way, legal writing is the entr6e into the
profession and the basic mastery of effective, ethical legal
communication is proof of one's worth as a lawyer.
The effective, modem writing professor must fully understand
that writing does not simply aid in improving stylistic skills; rather,
persuasive communication, both written and oral, is inextricably
coupled with and inseparable from sophisticated thinking and
forceful analysis.' 68 Judge Ripple implored law faculties and
administrators to appreciate this basic but important correlation of
mind and pen:
[W]e need to spend more time making the students conscious
of the intimate relationship between legal reasoning and legal
writing. Legal writing cannot be thought of as simply a "skills
course," to the extent that the term is used to describe parts
of the curriculum less important than "substantive" courses.
Indeed, a good writing instructor ought to take the lead in
convincing students that, in essence, the law school
experience is an education in how to think. Do we emphasize
sufficiently that writing is for most legal ventures the primary
engine that drives the reasoning process? 69
166. Honorable Kenneth F Ripple, Legal Writing in the New Millennium: Lessons
from a Special Teacher and a Special "Classroom,"74 NOTRE DAME L REV. 925, 929-30 (1999)
(citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
167. Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 104, at 42-43.
168. See id. at 48-61; Arrigo, supra note 2, at 139-40; Philip C. Kissam, Thinking (by
Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L REV. 135, 136-46 (1987); Levine, supra note 97, at
1073 n.25.
169. Ripple, supra note 166, at 928-29. Indeed, Judge Ripple made the intertwining of
legal discourse and legal thought the fulcrum of his article. See id. at 926 ("[W]riting [is] not
just a means of communication. It [is] a necessary tool for thining through the most
difficult problems.")
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The understanding that, "In fact, writing is an integral part of
thinking and cognitive development," 7 0 enjoys support not simply
from pragmatic experience but a wide-ranging body of theory. For
example, the noted philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, "For
a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ
the word 'meaning' it can be defied thus: the meaning of a word is
its use in the language." 17' By this Wittgenstein meant "that
communication exists on the basis of agreed patterns of word and
sentence usage."1 72 That communication of ideas is a function of
the patterns of language implicates the essential connection
between language (spoken and written) and the creation of
concepts.
Along similar lines, as one scholar recently observed, the
postmodern perspective of Jacques Derrida substantially informs
the nature of legal writing and the merit of those who teach it:
Derridean philosophy would label the separation of speech
and writing (and, by extension, of doctrine and writing) as a
futile endeavor . . . . To Derrida, "speech as a signifier of
thought, shares all the properties that we have associated with
writing. Speech is merely a special case of the generalized idea
of writing." Legal writing and legal doctrine occupy a similar
relation to each other. Each is necessary for the existence of
the other.173
Similarly, in a justifiably praised article on the theory of legal
writing, Professors Christopher Rideout and Jill Ramsfield espoused
an epistemic-societal perspective to explain the dynamics of legal
writing. The epistemic aspect accents that:
[W]riting is used not only to communicate knowledge, but also
170. Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 104, at 45 (citing Janet Emig, Writing as a
Mode of Learning, 28 C. COMPOSmON & COMM. 122 (1977)). See also Linda Flower & John R.
Hayes, A Cognitive Process Theory of Writing, 32 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 365 (1981); JOHN
R. HAYES & LINDA S. FLOWER, UNCOVERING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN WRITING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS, IN RESEARCH ON WRITING: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 207 (Peter Mosenthal et

al. eds., 1983).
171.

LUDWIG WrITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,

3d ed. 1958).
172. Bruce A- Markell, Truth, 72 IND. LJ. 1115, 1127 (1997). This led to the well known
and oft-cited conclusion by Wittgenstein that "we communicate through a web of
interconnected customs and conventions ... called language games." Id.
173. Lisa Eichhorn, Writing in the Legal Academy: A DangerousSupplement?, 40 APua
L REV. 105, 139 (quoting J.M. Ballin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LJ.
743, 757 (1987)).
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to generate knowledge. That is, writing plays a role in thinking
....
The epistemic view of writing emerges from a view of
language as being dynamic rather than static and from a view
of knowledge as being dialectical, the product of an
interaction between the writer, reader, subject, and text.
Knowledge does not exist except within linguistic forms that
both construct and constrain it. 174
Rideout and Ramsfield next enriched the philosophy of legal
writing by correcting a significant omission - the lack of a social
dynamic. That is, they broadened the focus from just the
"individual writer to acknowledge the social contexts within which
writing takes place and, thus, to acknowledge the ways in which
writing generates meanings that are shaped and constrained by
those contexts." 175 The meaning of words and the forms of
communication are not created outside of a social setting.
Particular modes of discourse are formed by the ethical, political,
economic, psychological and sociological paradigms of given social
groups. These discourse conventions, in turn, enhance the
paradigms espoused by the applicable groups, permitting those who
master the discourse - the language - to clarify, modify, expand
and otherwise apply the paradigms. Thus, to acquire membership in
a group, large or small, to comprehend the beliefs of the group, to
communicate effectively within the group and to critique the
paradigms that structure the group, an individual must know both
the group's language - the meaning of its words and terms - and
its forms of communication, oral and transcribed. 176
Discourse conventions of the given group, therefore, help to
acclimate the groups' members and are essential to convert
outsiders. To reverse a popular clich6, "If you want to walk the
walk, you have to talk the talk." Indeed, battles for the
predominancy of ideas within a given group and society are clashes
of competing discourse conventions. Clearly, the route to primacy
is through controlling the modes of acceptable argument within
177
given sectors of society.
174.
175.

Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 104, at 54-55 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 57. See also, e.g., Arrigo, supra note 2, at 139-40.

176.

See MARTHA

C. NUSSBAuM,

POETIC JUSTICE

62 (1995);

RONALD

DE

SOUSA, THE

RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 182 (1991);
Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider
Jurisprudence,34 WM. AND MARY L REV. 741, 744-45 (discussing law as narrative).
177. These principles are exemplified in "narrative theory" Narrative theory argues that
individuals and groups relate and interpret experiences through relating both stories and
"narrative," that is, clusters of stories which, taken as an entirety, impart lessons, define
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Those who teach discourse conventions - as do legal writing
professors - must understand the epistemic-societal dynamics,
limitations and received biases of their discipline as fostered by the
discipline's language. In addition and most importantly, they must
educate their students to apprehend those dynamics, limitations
and biases. Only then can students grasp how properly to
comprehend and to utilize legal arguments. 178
The responsibility of the writing professor, consistent with the
role of the other first year professors, is to introduce the novice to
the various discourse conventions - the languages and modes of
communication - that lawyers utilize. Grammar, syntax, sentence
structure and citation form are components of but hardly comprise
the heart of those discourse conventions. The education imparted
by writing teachers would be deficient indeed if they adopted the
worn and completely inaccurate approach that "writing-is-writing."
Rather, conceptualizing
legal arguments, forming rational
modifications and enlargements of existing legal concepts, devising
responsible new ideas, coping with multiple, often conflicting,
doctrines are all part of the modem legal writing course. Given the
epistemic-societal reality, it could hardly be otherwise.
Thus, far from either simple or simplistic, the notion of legal
writing as pedagogy is premised on a rich and sophisticated
philosophy. Contemporary writing professors fully understand that
the process of legal writing is neither metaphysical nor exclusively
instrumental. 179 And, indeed, despite their self-serving protestations
ethics and instruct modes of conduct. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim
Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L REV. 361, 383-85 (1996). Correspondingly, narrative
jurisprudence argues that the processes of law building and legal decision making, no less
than other human enterprises, involves reviewing and choosing among separate stories
brought together in a lattice of narrative. "The transformative insight of narrative scholarship
is that narrative structure and conventions shape all legal discourse." Id. at 382. See also,
e.g., Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply To Farberand Sherry, 46 VAND.
L REv. 665, 670-71 (1993); Delgado, supra note 176, at 744-45. Much narrative jurisprudence
attacks the status quo, arguing the familiar but critical point that the prevailing law is not
based on transcendent truths, but politics and power. Thus, the political agenda of many
theorists is unashamedly to change hearts and minds in the hope of replacing one discourse
structure - one set of narrative and paradigm languages - with another. See id. at 751;
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Book of Manners: How to Conduct a Conversation on Race Standing, Imperial Scholarship, and Beyond, 86 GEo. U. 1051, 1056 (1998).
178. Rideout and Ramsfield, supra note 104, at 59 (footnote omitted).
179. "[Flocus on instrumental writing misses the fundamental point that the writing
process itself can serve as an independent source, or critical standard, that alters and
enriches the nature of legal thought ....
[Tihe actual writing of the analysis, be it in an
appellate brief, law review article, memorandum, or estate plan, will allow the writer as
thinker to develop new connections or new ideas about what the law is and how it should
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that it is not intellectually exacting, "doctrinal" faculty have always
known that teaching legal writing is demanding not simply because
of the volume of work, but also because to instruct legal writing,
one must teach how to conceptualize law - the intellectual
180
process of lawyering.
2. The Structure of a Curriculum in First Year Legal Writing
The legal writing curriculum is designed to introduce the three
previously mentioned interrelated aspects: finding, analyzing and
communicating law.181 While discrete programs may vary in detail,
the following adumbration is typical. The first semester of the first
year begins with classes on "briefing" cases. Students read and
brief a line of cases, perhaps on relatively simple tort or contract
issues or on more complex matters such as police searches or the
definition of a "weapon" in criminal law.
Next, students receive a fact pattern related to the line of cases
they earlier briefed and are taught how to construct a simple
"office style" memorandum.182 The previously briefed cases
constitute the "closed universe" of law applicable to the assigned
fact pattern with which students draft their initial office
memoranda. In this way, the students' first legal memos become
manageable documents. The briefing and "closed memorandum"
exercises comprise students' introduction to the intricacies of legal
thought - isolating discrete legal concepts, harmonizing, to the
extent possible, seemingly conflicting standards of law,
conceptualizing the interplay of theory and fact, forming discrete
legal arguments and their first tentative attempts to communicate
legal ideas in writing.
In addition, often while in the process of writing their first
be applied in particular situations." Kissam, supra note 168, at 140.
180. "[Tlhe very proponents [favoring the disparate treatment of legal writing faculty],
when asked how they think and write, may suggest that the two are interwoven, that their
own creative thinking in the law progresses with and through their writing, that the process
of writing is in fact the process of problem-solving and thinking." Rideout and Ramsfield,
supra note 104, at 45 (footnote omitted).
181. "There is no dearth of literature or experience concerning how to deliver the
product of an outstanding writing course, and the institution willing to dedicate resources to
a fine program can have one." Arrigo, supra note 2, at 141 (footnote omitted).
182. An office memorandum is a document for the internal use of a law office. If
prepared for litigation it is entitled to protection as confidential "work product." See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The office memo addresses one or more issues arising from a given case or
client file. In essence, it is a strategy document that candidly assesses the strengths and
weaknesses of the client's legal position. See, e.g., LAUREL CURRIE OATEs ET AL, THE LEGAL
WRITING HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1998).
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memos, students are familiarized with the process of legal research
and the myriad primary and secondary sources through which
lawyers find applicable law and policy. Teaching legal research is
considerably more complex than it was twenty or even five years
ago given the numerous computer assisted modes of research that
did not exist until recently. Students are assigned legal research
exercises - the vaunted "paper chase" - requiring them to
become familiar with the research tools and sources of primary law
from which to build legal arguments. It is important to accent that
no less than legal writing, legal research is inextricably linked to
legal thought. Just as writing is not merely writing, neither is
research simply learning the names and locations of digests,
annotated codes, encyclopedias, treatises, Internet sites and other
familiar sources of law, analysis and commentary. Forming a
research strategy requires imagination and discipline. One cannot
attack a legal problem without conceptualizing - thinking about the nature of the problem and its probable meanings. One must use
legal discourse modes not only to choose among available research
tools but also to decide how to use each tool to its best advantage.
After completing and rewriting their "closed memos" and "paper
chases," students receive their first "open" memorandum
assignment which is the closest simulation they will experience in
the first year to acting on behalf of a client. Students are given a
fact pattern, perhaps in the form of a mock judicial opinion or
simulated trial transcript, from which they must discern one or
more legal issues to research. Based on the facts, students research
and draft lengthy office style memoranda without the benefit of
either an assigned closed universe of precedents or a book of
edited, applicable judicial opinions. Students form appropriate
research strategies, find the relevant legal materials and construct
(one hopes) terse, clear memoranda. The "open" memorandum
assignment is particularly demanding when the legal questions are
unresolved. Open memoranda assignments often involve questions
that have split the lower courts or raise fact patterns that have not
been addressed by the applicable court of last resort. Thus,
students do not have the luxury of advising in their memoranda
that a clear resolution of the particular legal question exists.
The second semester of first year legal writing commonly
consists of "moot court." Students research an intricate, complex,
unresolved issue of law and prepare an appellate level, professional
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quality advocacy brief8ls3 The semester culminates with oral
arguments in which the students argue their legal cases before a
panel of "judges," usually consisting of the legal writing professor,
alumni and law professors. Students are challenged by the panel to
defend their arguments the way practicing lawyers are questioned
by actual appellate benches.
The singular structure of legal writing programs provide further
evidence why, from the standpoints of both pedagogy and
workload, instructing legal writing, research and analysis is worthy
teaching. Standard law courses are taught pursuant to the
Langdellian "case book" containing already edited judicial opinions,
abridged statutes and heavily excerpted articles, all outlined
according to particular topics within the given discipline. Students
do not have to scrutinize entire judicial decisions, excessively
lengthy essays and turgid paragraphs of legislation to discover the
core points germane to the given topic of substantive law assigned
for the day's discussion. The tasks of the substantive law teacher
are to assure that students discern the points of the assigned case
excerpts and to incite students to critique those points for clarity,
logic, utility and consistency with other related aspects of law.
Legal writing, by contrast, requires students to research and to
analyze law directly from primary and secondary sources, without
the benefit of some expert's editing. The students must be taught
how to cull through the cases, commentaries and legislative
materials, discovering for themselves the applicable concepts and
discarding unrelated information.
While classroom instruction is indispensable in preparing groups
of students for the rigors of legal writing, clearly "the heart of our
teaching is found in the written critiques of our students' writing
and in the individual conferences we hold with our students to
discuss their work and our reactions to their work product." 1 4 It is
important to reemphasize the exacting demands placed on writing
professors in reviewing student-written material. Every aspect of
students' memoranda must be critiqued in detail: the cogency of
reasoning; the clarity of sections, paragraphs, sentences and
particular words; the organization of both arguments and discrete
183. Unlike the office memo which serves as an internal document candidly assessing
for strategic purposes the strengths and weaknesses of a client's case, the advocacy
memorandum or brief is prepared for a court or similar conflict resolution authority. The
advocacy document presents the client's position in the best possible light within the
confines of legal ethics. See OATES, supra note 182.
184.

Levine, supra note 97, at 1072 (footnote omitted).
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discussions within arguments; the choice of legal materials and the
tone of the prose. These and many other facets must be discussed
fully with each student in a series of individual conferences and
elucidated through meticulous explanations written by the teacher
on the face of each memorandum. 185 Thus, it is fair to say that for
the professors as well as the students, the work required during the
first semester of a well managed legal writing program - both
quantity and quality - is at least as rigorous, conceptual,
demanding and difficult as assignments found in any first year
course.
B. Purported Justification - Writing Professors Have Relatively
Mediocre Professional Credentials
Four other bases for disparate treatment need to be addressed to
apply the Supreme Court's rationality framework. It has been
argued that the credentials of legal writing professors are
considerably less impressive than those of tenure-track professors,
thus justifying lower pay and generally demeaned status. 186 The
185. The demands of properly reviewing and assessing student papers were wel
described by Professor Louise Harmon of Touro Law School. Professor Harmon assigned a

10-page paper to each of her property students to determine whether some students who did
poorly on examinations understood the materials but were unable to communicate their
knowledge in the pressured setting of an in-class test. Although many of her students did
well on the memorandum, Professor Harmon made the following notable and remarkably
candid observation:
But for me as a person, and particularly as a writer, it was a resounding failure. The
grading almost crushed me. I already had twenty long papers to critique and grade
from my Jurisprudence class, and forty short reflection pieces from the same course,
plus the ninety blue books from Property. The additional weight of ninety ten-page
papers was more than I could bear .

. .

. Unlike the mind-numbing, routine, and

rhythmic grading of blue books, these papers required my full attention. Each one
represented hours of human effort. I could not approach them with indifference. I did
not know how to take their words lightly, and so had to bear them heavily ....

It

was a desperate feeling, to watch the hours of each day slip away, paper by paper. I
felt as if I were moving through molasses, and no matter how diligent I intended to
be, the time allowed was never enough.
LoUISE HARMON AND DEBORAH W. POST, CULTIVATED INTELLIGENCE: POWER, LAW, AND THE POLmCS
OF TEACHING 96-97 (1996) (emphasis added). See also Arrigo, supra note 2, at 164-65
(discussing Prof. Harmon's experience); Levine, supra note 107, at 1081 n.50 ("The hours of
direct student contact, and the number of pages of student writing that the legal writing
professor must read and critique every year are the two most demanding parts about the
job."); Lee, supra note 99, at 485.
186. See Arrigo, supra note 2, at 155-59. For the purposes of this discussion, the
concept of "credentials" is traditional, embracing such criteria as a J.D. from a top law
school, high class rank therein including a position on the law review, possibly a
post-graduate degree, published scholarly articles, judicial clerkships and impressive law
practice experience.
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proper response to this claim is two-fold. First, even if that might
have been true early in the annals of legal writing, it is not true
today for many programs. In fact, many writing professors hold
very impressive J.D.s, were ranked high in their classes and served
on law review. Second, if "top" credentials are manifestly related to
both a propensity for teaching excellence and an enhancement of
the employing school's reputation, as most of academia believes,
there is no reason why the same minimum standard applied to the
most junior and inexperienced assistant professors cannot likewise
apply to individuals hired to teach legal research, analysis and
writing. As earlier established, legal writing is as difficult,
demanding, meaningful and conceptual as any other law school
offering. Thus, schools need not lower their standards, if they
actually now do so, for writing faculty.
C.

Purported Justification Produce Scholarship

Writing Professors Need Not

Another prevalent justification for the uneven treatment of
writing teachers is that writing professors are neither expected to
nor do they actually produce scholarship. 18 7 As with the critique of
credentials, the proper response to this assertion is two-pronged.
First, as an empirical matter, legal writing faculty publish and
publish well. Second, as a practical matter, law schools reasonably
may expect writing faculty to publish as a requisite for promotion
and tenure.
In point of fact, legal writing professors have produced
considerable scholarship covering both legal writing pedagogy and
myriad legal topics in other genres. Extensive bibliographies of
articles and books by writing professors are found, inter alia, in
Welcome to the Legal Writing Institute (listing over 160 articles
and 120 books); The Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs,s8 and
The Politics of Legal Writing.189 These articles demonstrate the
intellectual depth and creativity of legal writing faculties rivaling
the academic endeavors of tenure-track teachers. Furthermore,
there is no reason why schools cannot mandate a reasonable
187.

Id. at 167-68.
RALPH L BRIL ET AL, THE SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRIrrING PROGRAMS (1997).
189. JAN M. LEvINE ET AL, THE POLTICS OF LEGAL WRMNG: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE
FOR LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING PROGRAM DIRECTORS (1997). See also, e.g., Arrigo, supra note
2, at 123-42 (footnoting numerous articles); Jan M. Levine, Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured
and Tenure-Track Directors and Teachers in Legal Research and Writing Programs, 45 J.
188.

LEGAL EDUC. 531 (1995).
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amount of publication from writing faculty, especially those who
wish to attain tenure, to receive higher salaries and to participate
fully in faculty governance.
Too many faculties and administrations are content to allow the
legal writing faculty to toil in the fields without carrying the
academician's burden. Thus, in such cases writing faculty may not
deserve compensation equal to those upon whom the responsibility
of creating thought rests. Yet, writing professors have not asked for
and may not wish the liberty of those from whom little is expected.
Indeed, the hundreds of articles, books and other works that have
been produced by writing teachers attests to their love of
intellectual inquiry and their determination to join the community
of scholars even under adverse circumstances.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that, based on their
teaching responsibilities, it is more difficult for writing professors
than "doctrinal" professors to find time to publish, in other
contexts law schools do calibrate publication requirements with
certain teachers' classroom obligations. Most significantly, ABA
Standard 405(c) mandates that, if not accorded tenure-track status,
clinicians must be offered "a form of security of position
reasonably similar to tenure, . . . [and may be expected to satisfy]
standards and obligations reasonably similar to those of other
full-time faculty members."1 ° The ABA cautiously clarified in
Interpretation 405-7, however, that the standards for teaching and
scholarship "should be judged in terms of the responsibilities of
1' Thus, if it would be unreasonable to do so, law
clinical faculty." 91
schools cannot impose on clinicians publication responsibilities
identical to tenure-track faculty. Rather, any writing requirement
must be structured to add a reasonable obligation in exchange for
tenure-like job security. The same requirements surely can be
92
applied to legal writing professors.
190. ABA Standard
standards/chapter4.html>.

405(c) (visited Aug. 19,

1999) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/

191. ABA Interpretation 405-7 (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
standards/chapter4.html>.
192. To illustrate how easily law schools may recast tenure criteria to fit a particular
position, St. Thomas recently revised the standards for promotion and tenure of the law
librarian. Although a tenure-track member of the faculty with the authority, prestige and
compensation attendant thereto, the law librarian is not expected to teach and his
publication requisites are significantly less demanding than those required of other
tenure-track faculty.
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D. PurportedJustificationProtections of Tenure

Writing ProfessorsDo Not Need the

Tenure is a lifetime employment contract that can be rescinded
only for gross derelictions. The core effect of tenure is that it
prevents a professor from being dismissed because an educational
institution considers the teacher's research or writing to be too
controversial, anti-establishment, or politically discomfiting. Thus,
tenure is essential to assure the flow of imaginative, challenging,
and even factious scholarship, free from untoward censorship by
93
the academy.'
Certainly these considerations are no less applicable to legal
writing professors than to other teachers in American law schools.
We have seen that writing professors enjoy and participate avidly in
the intellectual stimulation of publishing scholarship. 194 Especially
given their debased professional status, writing professors need the
protection of job security if they wish to publish critical,
controversial commentaries on law, legal practice and legal
education. Indeed, many friends have expressed serious concern
about whether I might jeopardize my career by writing an essay
challenging the professional scruples of law schools that treat legal
writing distinctly differently from other disciplines.
As earlier accented, with rare exceptions, writing faculty have no
job protection. 195 The motivations to renew writing professors'
contracts are not formalized but, rather, comprise largesse - if the
law school is so disposed, it may acknowledge teaching excellence,
loyalty and professionalism among its writing faculty by extending
their contracts. Alternatively, maintaining that writing faculty have
no institutional expectation of continuous employment based on
merit, law schools may decline to extend contracts on any rational
or arbitrary basis not explicitly proscribed by law.
It might be argued that writing professors are covered by the
general policies promulgated by the ABA, AALS and AAUP
protecting academic freedom to publish contentious scholarship
193. See ABA Standards, Appendix 1 (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http-//www.abanet.org/
legaled/standards/appendix.html>; AALS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http:ll
www.aaup.org/1940stat.htm>; see also, e.g., James E. Perley, Tenure Remains Vital to
Academic Freedom, CHRONICLE OF H-IGHER EDUCATION, April 4, 1997; Ernst Benjamin, Some
Implications of Tenure for the Profession and Society (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://
www.aaup.org/ebten2.htm>; supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
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and to criticize their universities. 196 Thus, any writing professor
who feels that her academic freedom has been infringed may file a
grievance with those professional associations. Possibly, such a
grievance might succeed despite the low esteem in which writing
faculty are held by the ABA and the AALS. Yet, a law school likely
would have no difficulty contriving a facially plausible explanation
that a given writing teacher was not fired for controversial
research, but, rather, was let go because she was not teaching well.
Considering their demeaned professional status coupled with the
fact that, unlike tenure-track teachers, they require numerous
difficult written papers and assign students their first (often low)
grades in law school, even the best writing professors often are
subject to intense student criticism, criticisms that tenure-track
faculty are inclined to accept.' 97 A school so disposed could collect
a variety of seemingly serious, professional complaints and divert
attention from any motivation to penalize a writing teacher for
challenging the law school's mores. Whether the ABA, the AALS or
even sympathetic tenured faculty would expend the time and
political capital to protect writing professors (the law school's
misbegotten faculty) is questionable indeed. The reasonable writing
professor might conclude that it is not worth the risk; thus, she
may forego the exhilaration of writing controversial essays or
otherwise challenging the status quo, instead of exercising
198
cherished academic freedom.
E.

Purported Justification - Law Schools Cannot Afford to
Elevate the Status of Writing Professors

Regarding the assertion that it is too expensive to accord legal
writing professors the same salaries, perquisites and benefits as
tenure-track faculty, Professor Arrigo encapsulated all the response
truly necessary in two biting lines - "Of course, this is nonsense.
It is not impossible to pay LRW teachers more money, but doing so
requires a reallocation of resources."'19 Granted, schools may not
196. See ABA Standards, Appendix 1 (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/appendix.html> .
197. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
198. Granted, even if it embraced a new regime of improved status, a law school
could try to amass a record of seemingly cogent complaints to undermine a writing
professor's claim that adverse employment actions were retaliatory based on her
controversial politics. Nevertheless, contriving evidence to enshroud reprisals in a cloak of
scrupulousness would be abundantly more difficult if writing faculty were accorded full
respect, dignity and professional benefits.
199. Arrigo, supra note 2, at 171.
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want to redistribute resources, but, as we often instruct our
students when they complain that they "cannot do all the work,"
not wanting to do something is not equivalent to being unable to
2°°
do something.
Moreover, many of the indicia of status withheld from writing
professors can be bestowed with little, if any, fiscal expenditures.
Tenure-tracking or rolling, long-term contracts, votes at faculty
meetings, decent offices, respect, professional acknowledgment and
collegiality are relatively cost free, at least in terms of dollars.
Meanwhile, if given law schools truly are financially strained, they
can incrementally, but meaningfully, increase writing professors'
salaries over a course of academic years.
V. THE IRRATIONALITY OF THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF LEGAL
WRITING FACULTY

Part III of this work detailed the various forms of disparate
treatment that legal writing faculty endure because of their status
as legal writing faculty. Writing professors are substantially injured
by the disparate treatment - harmed financially through low
salaries, hurt professionally by the lack of respect from colleagues,
damaged communally through withholding of the franchise at
faculty meetings, and denied the peace-of-mind resulting from job
security. These disadvantages cannot in any reasonable sense be
considered minor, unimportant or trivial. Indeed, salaries, job
security, faculty governance and respect are key concerns of the
academy as reflected in ABA, AALS and AAUP standards. Law
schools know that these are important concerns because tenured
and tenure-track faculty would be loathe to relinquish to any
degree even one. Thus, the denial of the full trappings of
professionalism in legal academe is a serious matter and, under the
framework of professional ethics and rationality set forth in Parts I
and II, the disparate treatment must be justified by reasons
sufficiently substantial to warrant the impositions they cause.
If the treatment of legal writing faculty is irrational, state law
schools implementing the earlier described modes of disparate
terms and conditions of employment are arguably violating the
200. In this regard, Professor Arrigo set forth several interesting and plausible ways
that schools can accommodate writing faculty. "For instance, schools could elect to stop
hiring any new tenure-track faculty, regardless of legal specialty, choosing instead to fill all
new jobs with faculty on short-term, non-renewable contracts. LRW instructors who have
been at institutions for some years could be given priority for tenured slots as they became
available." Id. at 172.
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Constitution. More significantly, all law school faculties and
administrations are expected to uphold "the highest standards of
ethics and professionalism."20 1 In particular, because of their
"common membership in the community of scholars, [p]rofessors
[should] not discriminate against or harass colleagues." 20 2 As an
informative and appropriate model, law schools should abide by
the jurisprudence of constitutional rationality from which this
Nation's standards of minimal fairness arise. Indeed, it is
particularly fitting that law faculties and administrators, whose
singular responsibility it is to teach law, should rely on substantive
ethics enforced under law to help define professional-ethical
obligations owed to their institutions, their students and their
colleagues.
The justifications espoused by American law schools purporting
to vindicate their disparate treatment of legal writing faculties have
been reviewed and, in each instance, have been shown to be
lacking any significant verity.2°3 Writing faculty are not, nor need
they be, less credentialed, 2°4 less well published 20 and less in need
of tenure 20 6 than other faculty. Most importantly, the core excuse
for the disparate treatment - that teaching "doctrinal courses" is
more important, more demanding, more intellectual and more
20 7
theoretical than legal writing - is simply untrue.
In light of the fact that the five legitimate rationales are without
merit, nothing is left but arbitrary reasons such as the assertion by
law schools that they discriminate against legal writing faculty
because that is the way law schools have and will continue to treat
writing faculty. The notion that a categorization may constitute its
own justification rightly has been rejected as irrational. Some
rational basis, other than the internal consistency of the
classification itself, must underlie the legal, indeed moral, viability
of the classificatory scheme and its effects, both intended and
201. See AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of
Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://www.aals.org/
ethic.html>; see also supra notes 3-14 and accompanying text.
202. AAUP, Statement on Professional Ethics, Part III (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://
www.aaup.org/Rbethics.htm>.
203. See supra Part IV.
204. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text. Moreover, schools cannot justify
the wholesale exclusion of writing faculty from full law school citizenship on the spurious
notion that equalization will be too costly. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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We must look elsewhere for actual reasons supporting the
discriminatory treatment of legal writing professors to see whether
under a theory of fairness, the harm inflicted is outweighed by the
benefits reaped. As a threshold matter, any outright yearning to
inflict political, professional or economic harm for harm's sake is
irrational, unjust and in clear defiance of the moral precepts
underlying the ABA's, AALS's and AAUP's admonitions that law
schools must be bastions of ethics. As the Supreme Court firmly
stated in this regard, "[11f the constitutional conception of 'equal
protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare . . .desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."2°9 Thus,
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno held that although welfare
programs are neither a fundamental right nor a constitutional
imperative, Congress could not withhold food stamps from
households in which one person not kin to other household
members resided to prevent "hippies" living in communes from
obtaining that largesse. 210 Similarly, "animosity towards the class of
affected persons," was a constitutionally irrational explanation for a
Colorado constitutional amendment mandating that no specific
legal proscription of discrimination based on homosexual
211
preference could be enacted except by constitutional amendment.
Identically, imposing discordant terms of employment on legal
writing teachers simply because of institutional hostility or disdain,
unrelated to, indeed contrary to, actual merit, is equally unfair.
Nor can law schools justify the treatment of writing faculty on
the somewhat less invidious grounds that the tenure-track faculty
and administration either choose to believe or find it
administratively convenient to believe, regardless of
countervailing evidence, that the work of writing faculty is less
208. See supra notes 16-24; see generally Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897); see also, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 11, at 991-1000; Hafon, supra note
45, at 922-26. As Professor John Hart Ely cogently explained, if no other goal for the
classification is constitutionally required other than effectuating thoroughly the classification
itself, the classification of necessity "will import its own goal, each goal will count as

acceptable, and the requirement of a 'rational' choice-goal relation will be
very making of the [classificatory] choice." John Hart Ely, Legislative and
Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 Yale LJ. 1205, 1247 (1970).
209. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
210. Moreno, 413 U.S at 534. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying
complete discussion of Moreno.
211. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying
complete discussion of Romer.
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important and less difficult, and thus, less valuable to the academy,
than is the work of "doctrinal" professors. Misconceptions, cliches,
banalities, and worn biases are impermissible bases to disadvantage
substantially a class of individuals. 212 As the Court admonished over
twenty years ago, the Constitution has little patience for official
classifications that place distinct impediments on individuals or
groups if the classifications "bear[] no relation to the individual's
213
ability to participate in and contribute to society."
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,214 for example, the
Court invalidated an ordinance of Cleburne, Texas, requiring group
homes for mentally retarded persons to obtain special permits not
required of other group homes. The Court found the City's baseless
fears, misconceptions and prejudices inadequate reasons to impose
a unique and significant civic burden on those mentally retarded
persons who seek to establish group homes through which to
better integrate themselves into the social mainstream. 215 So, too,
baseless degrading of legal writing faculties and the work they
perform is a deficient rationale for law schools to vindicate
systemic discrimination designed to keep writing professors
politically, socially, professionally and economically disadvantaged
compared with other full-time teachers. To paraphrase one federal
court's splendid summary of constitutional rationality:
[A]n "irrational prejudice" cannot provide [a] rational
basis . . . . The "negative reaction" some members of the
community may have to [writing professors] is not a proper
basis for discriminating against them. . . .If the community's
perception is based on nothing more than unsupported
assumptions, outdated stereotypes, and animosity, it is
necessarily irrational and . . .provides no legitimate support
216
for [law school governance] decisions.
Identically, law schools cannot rationally attempt to carve within
their societies a caste of teachers who, although performing equally
with tenure-track faculty, are deprived the benefits of full law
school citizenship. 217 Even if the school acted without invidious
212. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
213. Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976). Accord Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S.
852, 854 n.5 (1986).
214. Cleburne, 473 U.S at 450. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text for a more
complete discussion of Cleburne.
215. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
216. Weaver v Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287-89 (D. Utah 1998).
217. See supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
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intent, or, indeed, even if the school did not so intend at all, the
inadvertent creation of a caste system is irrational if the
218
detrimental effects outstrip the benefits. In Zobel v. Williams,
Alaska sought to express its gratitude for the perseverence and
loyalty of long-time residents by distributing monetary "dividends"
from State coffers based on duration of residence; it did not intend
to create a caste system. Despite the lack of either a vicious
motivation or a desire to create a caste, the Court struck the
dividend distribution scheme as irrationally linking receipt of state
largesse to seniority of residency, thus implying that some citizens
were better than and, thus, "more equal than others."2 19
Similarly, in striking a New Mexico statute awarding a $2000
property tax exemption to veterans of the Vietnam War who had
been residents of the state prior to May 8, 1976, the Court held:
The State may not favor established residents over new
residents based on the view that the State may take care of
"its own," if such is defined by prior residence. Newcomers, by
establishing bona fide residence in the State, become the
State's "own" and may not be discriminated against solely on
220
the basis of their [later] arrival ....
In addition, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, the Court ruled that
government may not create a caste of realty owners forced to pay
substantially higher taxes than equivalently situated property
holders because the burdened group has done nothing to warrant
the imposition of higher taxes.221 The Court logically held that "the
fairness of one's allocable share of the total property tax burden
can only be meaningfully evaluated by comparison with the share
222
of others similarly situated relative to their property holdings."
Applying the rationales of Zobel and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal,
law schools cannot designate certain faculty as "more equal than
others" and, in a discriminatory fashion, "take care of 'its own' " by
disadvantaging legal writing professors whose work, in fact, is as
demanding and as crucial as the instruction provided by the
tenure-track faculty. Paraphrasing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, such
218. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 57. Zobet is discussed in greater detail in notes 80-84, supra,
and accompanying text.
219. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 71 (Brennan, J., concurring).
220. Hooper, 472 U.S. at 623 (1985) (citing, inter alia, Zobel). Hooper is discussed in
greater detail in notes 85-87, supra, and accompanying text.
221. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., 488 U.S. at 345-46.
222. Id. at 346. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text for a more
comprehensive discussion of rationality and property taxation.
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discrimination is irrationally unfair because "the fairness of one[]
[teacher's] allocable share of the [resources of a law school] can
only be meaningfully evaluated by comparison with the share of
other[] similarly situated [teachers] relative to their [contribution to
the life of the law school]." It bears repeating that writing faculty
and tenure-track professors are not dissimilarly situated in regard
to their respective contributions to the law school community. Both
groups of teachers tend to be equally credentialed, equally loyal to
their respective schools and are required to teach equally
demanding subjects.
The fact that writing faculty are not compelled to produce
scholarship is irrelevant because they are not offered the option of
accepting either a tenure-track appointment with requirements
commensurate with other tenure-track faculty or a lower paying,
non-tenure track position with comparably fewer responsibilities.
The mandated denial of the opportunity to satisfy the attendant
responsibilities of full faculty citizenship is no benefit at all. Even
without germane legislative prohibitions, surely schools would
violate standards of professional ethics if they deliberately limited
both the workload and the opportunities for professional
advancement based on particular teachers' race, gender, religion,
political persuasion, marital status, sexual preference, age or any
number of similar bases unrelated to merit and ability. So, too,
denial of professional prestige and opportunity predicated on the
label "legal writing" offends cardinal concepts of fairness.
Law schools are not vindicated by the spurious argument that
because legal writing faculty are informed prior to commencing
employment that they will not be treated equally with other faculty,
they agree to the disparate terms by signing their contracts. The
imposition of the irrational contractual terms is the transgression;
and the fact that, for whatever reasons, legal writing professors
decide to accept those terms is no estoppel from subsequently
challenging the bona fides of those terms. Were it otherwise, all
discriminatees would be disqualified from vindicating their rights if,
for economic or professional reasons, it was to their advantage to
accept the disclosed disparate conditions of employment rather
than to forego the work and sue the employers with the hope that
eventually a court would require the employers to hire the
individuals on nondiscriminatory terms. If full divulgence was all
that was necessary, many, perhaps most, prominent civil rights
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challenges would have lacked merit. 223
Law schools cannot justify their disparate treatment by arguing
that for efficiency, economy and convenience, they have
determined that one class of full-time faculty with substantial
teaching responsibilities will not be tenure tracked. When, "the
State's articulated goal could have been completely served by
requiring a coin flip [, the resulting] . . . legislative decisions are
inimical to the norm of impartial government."u 4 For instance, Reed
v. Reed 22 5 struck as irrational an Idaho statute mandating that
among individuals equally entitled to administer intestate estates,
men would be chosen over women without providing women the
opportunity to establish superior qualifications. The Court accented
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits "different treatment...
of persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute."226 Based
on that standard, Idaho could not justify preferring men over
227
women despite any efficiency promoted by such a designation.
Identically, selecting full-time legal writing professors for adverse
treatment is no more rational than singling out women as ineligible
to administer intestate estates. Because it has been shown that the
work of writing professors is not less demanding nor less
important than teaching performed by "doctrinal" faculty, law
schools might just as well have designated contracts teachers or
property teachers or teachers born in the month of January as the
class that, for efficiency purposes, will not be tenure-tracked.
Equally unconvincing is the argument that "traditionally" writing
professors have not been treated as full faculty in the legal
academy. It is simply absurd to aver that the institutional inertia
against according legal writing professors appropriate dignity and
respect is a sufficient justification for the inertia itself. As Justice
Holmes bitingly asserted:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
223. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974); 29 U.S.C. §
626(f)(1)(c) (waiver under Age Discrimination in Employment Act). For example, under a
theory of full disclosure, the Court would have dismissed Moreno on the basis that selfless
Ermina Sanchez decided to waive her right to object when, as an act of kindness, she
accepted ailing Jacinta Moreno into her home, thereby knowingly forfeiting food stamps for
herself and her children.
224. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 n.24. See generally supra notes 55-61 and accompanying
text.
225. Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
226. Id. at 75-76.
227. See id. at 72-74.
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that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
228
imitation of the past.
Justice Holmes's celebrated quote explains that the persistence of
irrational discrimination certainly cannot be the warrant for its
continuance. Inasmuch as writing faculties should have been
accorded complete law school citizenship in the past, the long
overdue nature of that entitlement strengthens rather than weakens
the case for redress.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In his final opinion as a Supreme Court Justice, a disheartened
Thurgood Marshall caustically concluded, "Power, not reason, is
the new currency of this Court's decision-making." 229 The
discordant treatment of full-time legal writing faculties likewise has
little to do with reason and everything to do with power. The
purported rational grounds for the adverse terms of employment
and other forms of disaffection have been disproved. All that
remains to premise the maltreatment are misconceptions,
outmoded stereotypes and prejudice concerning legal writing
faculty. Thus, the policies of most American law schools regarding
legal writing are irrational. Given the lack of rational bases coupled
with the damage inflicted on writing teachers, the irrationality
practiced by law schools is unfair as defined by the federal
judiciary's standards of minimal justice under the Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause. It is urged, therefore, that the
discriminatory treatment of full-time writing faculties violates "the
highest standards of ethics and professionalism" 230 required of all
institutions of legal education and of their faculties and
administrations that are the embodiment of those institutions. The
ethical standard is blunt but exacting: "Professors do not
discriminate against or harass colleagues." 231 The treatment of
228. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L REV. 457, 469 (1897).
Accord United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 53-54 (1960).
229. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230. See ABA Commission on Professionalism, "In the Spirit of Public Service": A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http:ll
www.aals.org/ethic.html>. See also, e.g., AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law
Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and ProfessionalResponsibilities (visited Aug.
19, 1999) <http://www.aals.org/ethic.html>; supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
231. AAUP, Statement on Professional Ethics, Part III (visited Aug. 19, 1999) <http://
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writing faculty members clearly is irrationally discriminatory; it,
therefore, cannot be ethical.

www.aaup.org/Rbethics.htm>.

